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ABSTRACT
United States public diplomacy, the business of
influencing foreign public opinion by generating goodwill
through informational and cultural programs, debuted in
Latin America in the 193 0s. Once the government entered the
field, public diplomacy, the province of the private sector
for 150 years, would no longer exist for its own sake.
The
government endeavor would set a dual precedent for the
mission of cultural relations, as an agent of intercultural
goodwill and as an instrument of foreign policy, and
establish a tradition that would define and shape U.S.Soviet cultural relations.
Cold War public diplomacy, like its predecessor, was a
bilateral private-public enterprise, on a shoestring budget.
But Cold War cultural relations differed from the Latin
American precedent.
Two major events, World War II and the Cold War, worked
to transform cultural relations from a blunt instrument
designed to protect national security and meet general
needs, to a refined instrument fashioned to achieve specific
foreign policy goals, as outlined in the 1956 National
Security Council Directive 5607. In the process, cultural
relations changed from a defensive tool, an antidote to
security and cultural problems, to an offensive tool, a
penetrating force which, through persuasion and propaganda,
forged both a channel of communication and a pathway for
information between warring blocs.
One unlikely facet of cultural diplomacy, performing
arts exchange, acted especially well as a tool to fight
communism, serving as handmaiden to the achievement of U.S.
foreign policy objectives.

THE COLD WAR CULTURAL ACCORD:
HOW THE EAST WAS WON

Frontispiece
"Cold War on the Cultural Front"
New York Times Magazine
13 April 1958
At Brussels the U.S. and Russia will compete
for the minds of men with their arts.
From Thursday through Oct. 19 the eyes of the world will be
on Brussels and its World's Fair. The attendance figures
are expected to be in the impressive millions but, no matter
how steeply they mount, millions upon millions will read and
hear about this international exposition.
For it promises to
be something more than a conventional fair.
It will be the
place where the cold war, fought with the weapons of art and
drama, music and dance, architecture, books and films, will
reach a climax.
If a cold war is unavoidable, it is least perilous when
waged with laughter and beauty, with heart-lifting aspira
tions and life-giving visions.
For the arts do not destroy;
they create.
They remind us that the soul of man is indivi
sible, no matter what distances and differences there may be
among nations and their political, economic and social
institutions.
Because the arts express man's precious inner life, they have
a special power to exorcise his fears and hymn his hopes.
They can surmount the barriers of languages and frontiers.
They can be an eloquent ally in the struggle for mutual
understanding and trust.
If you wish to win the good opinion
and affection of peoples, you will do so more persuasively if
you show them your artistic achievements than if you display
your strength or material wealth.
That is why culture has become such a potent force in the
cold war between West and East and particularly between the
United States and Russia. Even as the contending giants
compete for attention in probing the secrets of the atom
and in conquests of outer space, even as they compete for
goodwill with their largesse in underprivileged areas, they
dare not forget the intangible things--the dreams and secret
murmurings that speak from heart to heart more surely and
swiftly than a guided missile.
That is why the competition
in the arts will turn the Brussels Fair into an arena the
like of which the world has not seen.

I
FOREWORD
This thesis concerns itself, generally, with the role
of public diplomacy in international relations, and
specifically, with the use of cultural diplomacy as a tool
to fight Soviet communism.

During the Cold War, so the

central argument of this thesis goes, the U.S. government
used public diplomacy, especially performing arts exchange,
both to ameliorate East-West tensions and to launch a
cultural offensive on behalf of specific foreign policy
goals.

The cultural offensive penetrated Soviet society,

thereby acting on Policy Conclusion 8 in the National
Security Council Directive 5607.

Dated 29 June 1956, the

policy point called for an "offensive in terms of promoting
a desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and
security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence
within the satellites."1
Public diplomacy consists of two branches,
informational and cultural.

Informational diplomacy

includes broadcast and print media, libraries, information
centers, and publications, the conduct of which fell under
the jurisdiction of the United States Information Agency
(USIA) after 1953.

Cultural diplomacy includes academic,

professional, and performing arts exchanges, the execution
of which has been overseen by both the Department of State
1Appendix A.
3

and the USIA.
The U.S. government began its public diplomacy efforts
in 1938 with the inauguration of the Division of Cultural
Relations within the Department of State.

Until that time#

cultural relations had been overseen and financed by the
private sector.

The government's 1938 pilot initiative

debuted in Latin America in response to a perceived threat
to the national interest, when Nazi propaganda in Latin
America violated the one hundred year-old Monroe Doctrine.
During World War WII, the Office of War Information (OWI)
conducted a campaign of public diplomacy and propaganda on
behalf of the war effort.
After 1953, with the creation of the USIA, public
diplomacy became an official and effectual instrument of
U.S. foreign policy.

Under the wing of the Department of

State, the cultural branch of public diplomacy featured
performing arts exchange as the central agent in a cultural
offensive.

Interestingly, performing arts exchanges served

the national interest of each bloc during the Cold War, and
became a handmaiden that carried out both U.S. and USSR
foreign policy objectives, especially from 1958 to 1964, the
time period examined in this thesis.
Given the formidable Soviet propaganda machinery, it is
not surprising that the USSR was able to use cultural
diplomacy effectively.

The surprise is, given the modesty

of the United States' commitment and effort, that U.S.

cultural diplomacy could be engaged effectively on behalf of
U.S. objectives and goals.

America's historical reluctance

to enlist the government in cultural activities, and its
aversion to anything resembling propaganda, kept government
involvement to a minimum.
Over a fifty-five year period of official U.S. public
diplomacy, the relationship of public diplomacy and foreign
policy has been debated by government officials, academics,
artists, and those in the commercial private sector.

Two

broad schools of thought have staked out defensible
positions on the subject.

One school holds that public

diplomacy should serve at the behest of the national
interest, and function as a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
The other contends that cultural diplomacy should exist to
improve mutual understanding among peoples, without being
tied to specific foreign policy objectives.
Public diplomacy as it has evolved is actually both.
It has officially and traditionally been heralded as an
agent of international goodwill.

But it has also been

marshalled to protect the national interest and promote
foreign policy goals.

Certainly during U.S.-Soviet Cold War

relations, public diplomacy served in both capacities,
neither of which is easily quantified for the purpose of
evaluation.

Although the effects of public diplomacy are

beyond precise measure, this thesis looks at three factors
in order to gauge the effects of the effort and to argue

6
that it constituted a small but important part of Cold War
foreign policy strategy: the origin, evolution, and fate of
public diplomacy from its Latin American debut through the
mid Cold War; the relationship of public diplomacy to
propaganda; and the use of public diplomacy as an instrument
of foreign policy in a case study of U.S.-Soviet Cold War
cultural relations from 1958 to 1964.
Chapter Two offers an introduction to public diplomacy,
a kind of definition-in-progress that spans fifty-five
years.

Between 1938 and 1993, public diplomacy was

reinvented in accordance with changing vogues in foreign
policy regimes.

Consequently, public diplomacy has been

defined as both informer and persuader, as a tool of
persuasion and an agent of good will.
In a brief historical overview that lays the foundation
for the thesis argument, Chapter Three looks at the origins
of public diplomacy and tackles the subject of its
relationship to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Beginning

with the 1938 Latin American Experiment, public diplomacy
assumed a dual mission--fostering goodwill and furthering
foreign policy goals.
Chapter Four charts the evolution of public diplomacy.
The use of propaganda during World War II and the Cold War
transformed public diplomacy from a defensive to an
offensive foreign policy tool.
Chapter Five contemplates the fate of public diplomacy,
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and introduces a case study from U.S.-Soviet relations,
1958-1964.

Looking at histories, philosophies, and

objectives of U.S.-Soviet cultural relations, and comparing
them to the Latin American precedent, the analysis concludes
that cultural diplomacy in the Cold War assumed prominence
because it provided a means by which each bloc could pursue
its foreign policy goals.

The American debate over

engagement in official cultural relations, which caused
internal wranglings in the executive and legislative
branches and threatened the life of public diplomacy, was
resolved by the Cold War need to counter Soviet antiAmerican propaganda.

Subsequent support of public diplomacy

by the American executive, American popular press, and
American public, and directives from the National Security
Council, sealed its fate as a player in the foreign policy
arena.
Continuing the case study, Chapter Six examines "The
Big Swap,11 both informational and cultural diplomacy, in
U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations.

Informational exchanges,

which include national exhibits, print and electronic media,
and professional people-to-people exchanges, were not as
successful for the U.S. as hoped, because Soviet tactics
caused persistent problems with reciprocity, travel
restrictions, and the censoring and jamming of information.
It remained for cultural diplomacy, especially performing
arts exchanges,

to pick up the diplomatic slack.

Cultural
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exchanges were much less likely to be suspect tools of
foreign policy, whereas informational programs could easily
be misconstrued as pure propaganda. Ironically, cultural
diplomacy, long relegated to diminutive status by
informational and traditional diplomacy, kept an auxiliary
line of diplomacy open between the warring blocs, thereby
serving the very forces by which it had been marginalized
historically.
Chapter Seven argues that cultural exchanges were an
arena in which U.S.-Soviet interests dovetailed, and
therefore became a Cold War exchange of choice.

Performing

arts exchanges were a foreign policy coup for each bloc,
helping each achieve foreign policy goals.

The Soviets were

able to project a favorable image to the world and gain
American dollars.

The U.S. gained access to Soviet soil,

and, according to a vision initially advanced by Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, gained a way to infuse ideas
and information into the Soviet Union.
Each side benefitted from performing arts exchange, but
the U.S. in particular was able to launch a cultural
offensive and to enact a positive, non-threatening foreign
policy that infused American ideas into Soviet society, as
called for in National Security Council Directive 5607.
Without the relief of East-West cultural exchange, the
continual crises in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold
War--the U-2 incident, the Berlin Crisis, the Bay of Pigs,
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and the Cuban Missile Crisis--would have been unbearably
tense.

Without the cultural offensive, U.S. foreign policy

would have been inadequately limited to the defensive
strategy of containment, falling short of directives in NSC
5607.
Thus, cultural diplomacy, long associated with long
term, intercultural understanding and goodwill, was engaged
by the U.S. government to effect its short-term critical
foreign policy goals, as listed in NSC 5067.

The popular

press, unofficial thermometer of the East-West Cold War
climate, spread word of the success of this cultural
offensive, enabling public diplomacy to do what it has been
designed to do, favorably influence public opinion, in both
the U.S. and USSR.

II

Life Magazine
28 April 1958
"Ambassadors Trying to Get Summit Show
Also on the Road"
After the people-to-people preliminaries, the
diplomat-to-diplomat preliminaries of the most
important East-West show of all--the summit
meeting--finally inched onto the road. The
West challenged the Soviets to take presummit
negotiations out of the realm of public
propaganda into that of private talks. Within
24 hours, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
began holding secret sessions with the French,
British and U.S. envoys in Moscow.
The Western initiative recovered some of the face
the West had lost by its clumsy handling of the
summit propaganda issue. But the Moscow meetings
did not mean the East-West gap was necessarily
narrowed. Moscow still wanted to rush into a
summit propagandathon. The West still insisted
that a meeting of the chiefs of state be care
fully prepared so that it could really achieve
something.
Even while receiving the Western ambassadors,
Gromyko took time out to make a distorted
charge that nuclear-armed U.S. bombers were
threatening the U.S.S.R. The U.S., denying the
accusation, met it head-on by welcoming its
prompt examination by the U.N. The West wanted
to make sure that progress toward the summit
main performance would not be diverted by
Gromyko's propaganda sideshow.

THE DEFINITIONS
For a century and a half, the United States turned its
nose up at public diplomacy, the business of influencing
foreign public opinion by generating goodwill through
informational and cultural programs.

Although U.S.

diplomacy dates to the efforts of luminaries such as
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, public diplomacy,
long associated with the questionable business of
propaganda, never got off the ground until the 1930s.

Then,

in response to a dual imperative--to counteract unwelcome
foreign propaganda in the hemisphere and to build hospitable
relationships among peoples of the Americas1--the U.S.
rethought its attitude toward propaganda, and dabbled in
public diplomacy.

The Division of Cultural Relations within

the Department of State was formed in 1938 to oversee all
official cultural affairs.
"The U.S. was the last of the major powers to develop a
government program in the cultural field,1,2 say public
diplomacy experts, Charles Thompson and Walter Laves.

In

1953, fifteen years after its initial experiment in public
diplomacy, and in response to the Cold War, the U.S. founded
XJ. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S.
Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948, Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1976, 67.
2Charles Thomson and Walter H.C. Laves, Cultural
Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U.
Press, 1963), 31.
11
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the United States Information Agency, a government organ
officially dedicated to dispensing U.S. public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is a many-spendoured thing, and a host
of definitions compete to capture its essence.

It has been

altered by different administrations, as each attempted to
enlist public diplomacy in the service of its own
objectives, shaping its definition to various ends: as
cultural relations,3 as cultural diplomacy,4 as a word war
of propaganda,5 as part of a correlation of forces in a
cultural offensive,6

as a war of ideas,7 as a means of

Communicating With the World and as President Truman's
Campaign of Truth,8 as psychological warfare during the
Eisenhower years, and as an opportunity to "tell America's
story to the world."9
Definition-in-Progress
Historically, the term public diplomacy, a 20th-century
3Espinosa, vii.
4Frederick Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1960), 5.
5Thomas Sorensen, The Word War: The Story of American
Propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 11.
6Richard F. Starr, Editor, Public Diplomacy: USA versus
USSR (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Press Publication, 1986), ix.
7Frank Ninkovich,
The Diplomacy of Ideas
Cambridge U. Press, 1981), 2.

(Cambridge:

8Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, Inc., 1991), 3.
9Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer
Age, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 5.
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neologism, arose to describe an activity that has, more or
less, coincided with a growth in communications in the last
half of the 20th century.10

The term is attributed to Dean

Guillion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy who
initially defined it, in 1965, as a 11transnational flow of
information and ideas," a rubric grand enough to provide
safe haven for intellectual debate over the nature and
purpose of public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is sometimes described as an exchange
of ideas.
notes,

"For students of diplomacy," Frank Ninkovich

"cultural relations are first and foremost a

specialized form of statecraft concerned with the management
of intellectual influences in international politics."11
John Reinhardt, first President of International
Communications Agency, the 1978 incarnation of the USIA,
described public diplomacy as "the efforts through which the
U.S. government enters the marketplace of ideas."12

Until

193 8, the U.S. government had left the "marketplace of
ideas" in the invisible hands of the private sector, as
Charles Thomson and Walter Laves explain:
Until 193 8 the United States government had left the
responsibility for transnational cultural activities in
private hands.
The government had taken no defined
attitude beyond that of general, if casual,
encouragement of cultural activities as a phase of
10Ibid. , 221.
1:LNinkovich,

1.

12Hansen, 12 .
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peaceful cooperation among peoples. Like trade,
cultural activities were viewed as predominantly private
in character, though they could be helped or hindered by
government action; essentially reciprocal and mutually
advantageous; directed toward non-governmental ends but
presumably consistent with the objectives of foreign
policy.13
In its unabridged theoretical version, public diplomacy
was formally defined in 1965 by Edmund Guillion, former
American diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, as follows:
The role of the press and other media in international
affairs, cultivation by governments of public opinion,
the non-governmental interaction of private groups and
interests in one country with those of another, and the
impact of these transnational processes on the
formulation of policy and the conduct of foreign
affairs.14
In practice,

"public diplomacy complements and reenforces

traditional diplomacy by seeking to communicate with peoples
of other nations,"15 said then Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, circa 1977.

It supports traditional

diplomacy through cooperation and competition.
War,

In the Cold

for example, public diplomacy allowed warring blocs to

cooperate and compete through exchanges of ballet companies,
symphonies, and theatrical companies.
Public diplomacy has meant cooperation between states.
According to scholar and diplomat Hans Tuch, public
diplomacy has brought cooperation "because of a need for a
13Thomson-Laves, 28.
14Tuch, 8.
15Hansen, 3 .
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long-term process requiring credibility and deep
understanding among cultures."16

In the tense and

dangerous years of the Cold War, any improvement in
relations between the superpowers required that they
cooperate in certain ways.
competition.

Public diplomacy has also meant

As Frederic Barghoorn, diplomat and Yale

University professor of law, sees it, "Cultural diplomacy is
the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for
propaganda purposes," and is useful in "inducing others to
behave in a way in which they would not behave in its
absence."17

Cold War cultural diplomacy induced the Soviet

Union to open its society to alien influences, and,
incidentally, induced a reluctant U.S. to stage a cultural
offensive.
Often, mistakenly, public diplomacy is associated only
with competition and propaganda, in the pejorative sense.
But public diplomacy is a mix of the competitive and
cooperative--of, for example, propaganda and information.
For diplomat Thomas Sorensen, a party to Cold War cultural
diplomacy, there is no conflict between the competitive and
cooperative roles of public diplomacy.

He claims that the

U.S. government's information campaign had to include
propaganda in order to succeed:

16Starr, 154.
17Barghoorn, 10.

16
When I joined the U.S. Government's foreign information
program in 1951, I did not consider my colleagues and
myself to be "propagandists." We were disseminating
only "information" designed to "tell America's story to
the world," and our hope was that if others could come
to know us better they would learn to appreciate,
respect, and sometimes even love us. I was wrong:...I
found that we had to make a case for our views, as
others, were doing. We had to be advocates, persuaders-propagandists.18
NSC 5607
At the end of the day, public diplomacy earns its wings
only when it performs according to official definitions and
directives.

In 1956, National Security Directive 5607 (NSD

5607) directly tied cultural relations to foreign policy
objectives.

In Policy Conclusion 8, the document described

how public diplomacy could function as an offensive policy
in fighting the Cold War:
Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so far
as the use of force is concerned. But they can be
offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater
individual freedom, well-being and security within the
Soviet Union, and greater independence within the
satellites.
In other words, East-West exchanges should
be an implementation of positive United States foreign
policy.19
Influencing public opinion and behavior through cultural
diplomacy may ring lofty, but it is compatible with
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' vision of liberating

18Sorensen, 154.
19NSC 5607, "Statement of Policy by the National Security
Council on East-West Exchanges: General Considerations,"
29 June 1956, 4. (Please see Appendix A ) .
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the communist peoples through non-violent means.20
NSD 5607 continued to govern East-West exchanges
throughout the Cold War.

Within that time, however,

changing administrations and foreign policies would
emphasize either cooperation or competition.

Early in the

Carter years, for example, then Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, laid out the purposes of public
diplomacy, all of which stressed cooperation over
competition, and four of which could easily have been
written in the 1930s, when the U.S. launched its Latin
American cultural relations initiative:
1.
2.
3.
4.

To insure that other nations more accurately
understand this country, its values, institutions,
and policies.
To insure that our understanding of other nations
and of our interrelationship with them is informed
and accurate.
To insure that mutual understanding is bolstered by
collaborative individual and institutional
relationships across cultural lines.
To insure that as the international policies of our
Government are formed, we take into account the
values, interest and priorities of publics abroad.

There is no mention of fighting communism or winning the
Cold War here.

Five years later, however, in 1983 during

the Reagan administration, an official cultural manifesto.
National Security Directive 77 (NSDD-77), once again spoke
of a "cultural offensive."

Public diplomacy, the document

20Dulles Statement on Liberation, January 15, 1953,
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, on the Nomination
of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State-Designate
(Washington, D.C., 1953), 5-6.
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declared, included 11those actions of the government designed
to generate support for our national security
objectives."21

This directive, too, might well have been

written in the 1930s, during the Latin American initiative.
Interestingly, public diplomacy has been seen as both a
cultural offensive and an agent of cultural understanding.
The domain of public diplomacy is also seen, according to
Ninkovich, as either a fringe area of diplomacy or as the
totality of relations between culture: "Although cultural
relations are a minor form of diplomacy, at the same time
the entire foreign policy process is itself subordinate to
large cultural dynamics."22

When public diplomacy operates

as an agent of cultural understanding, it seems to occupy a
fringe area of diplomacy.

But when public diplomacy has

acted in support of the national interest as a cultural
offensive, as it did in the early Cold War, it embodied what
Ninkovich called the totality of cordial relations between
cultures.

Thus, Cold War artistic exchanges, acting as

participants in a cultural offensive and surrogates for
warring cultures and world views, gained unusual prominence
during the Cold War.

The stakes were high when Russian and

American ballet companies and symphonies performed on each
other's soil, because they were representatives not only of
aspects of national culture but of competing world views.
21Tuch, 7.
22Ninkovich, 2.

19
Today/ diplomats acknowledge that cultural exchange
is vital because foreign policy, which takes place in a
broad cultural context, may be implemented more easily when
accompanied by efforts toward intercultural understanding.
John Tuthill, former Ambassador to the European Community
and Brazil, relates that he now knows that he could have
attached more importance to cultural diplomacy, because it
is so essential to relations between nations.23

During the

Cold War, cultural exchange was essential to, and
indispensible in, East-West relations as a forum for
cooperation through healthy competition, and as a lifeline
that kept U.S.-Soviet relations alive, if not well.

23Interview with Ambassador John Tuthill, June 1992.
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Time Magazine
August 8, 193 8
THE CABINET: Culture Division
No secret to the U.S. State Department has been the
penetration, economic and intellectual, of the German
and Italian dictatorships in Latin America.
Secretary
Hull's reciprocal trade treaties with Latin America are
a move to meet Europe on economic grounds....
Except for Franklin Roosevelt's sensational selling
tour in 193 6, however, the U.S. has been too sensitive
to the cry of imperialism at home and abroad to
organize a U.S. export trade in ideas.
Not without misgivings Assistant Secretary of State
George S. Messersmith appeared two months ago before
the House Appropriations Committee to ask Congress
to enable his Department to do something "we would
perhaps prefer not to do."
What Mr. Messersmith asked for and got was money to
establish two new State Department cells, a Division
of Cultural Relations and a Division of International
Communications, both aimed straight at "relations
with our Latin American republics.11
Last week Secretary Hull and Under-Secretary Welles
announced that the Division of Cultural Relations
will be launched forthwith. Duties: "The exchange
of professors, teachers, and students... cooperation
in the field of music, art, literature... inter
national broadcasts...generally, the dissemination
abroad of the representative, intellectual and
cultural work of the U.S." First year's appropria
tion:
$27,920.
The modest size of the kitty, said Mr. Welles, was
proof that the new Division "is not a propaganda
agency."
Chief Cherrington's immediate job will be to wheedle
more money from private and educational sources,
prepare an impressive intellectual splash....

THE DEBUT
All of the classic hallmarks of U.S. public diplomacy
are cited in this 1938 Time article: its joint privatepublic arrangement; its bilateral, exchange aspect; its
sensitivity to the issue of propaganda and charges of
imperialism; its modest scale; its tentative tone; and its
trafficking in culture and ideas with an intent to address
national security and foreign policy goals.
With all of the misgivings that persist fifty-five
years later, the U.S. government threw a modest amount of
caution to the wind, and constructed the Division of
Cultural Relations within the Department of State in 1938.
The Division, with the Office of Education, was to carry out
two programs: informational activities, including overseas
print and electronic media efforts, libraries, information
centers, and publications; and cultural programs, including
educational, professional, and artistic exchanges.
Although worldwide in concept, U.S. public diplomacy, a
new dimension in the State Department's diplomatic
repertoire, was initially limited to inter-American cultural
exchange, as part of the Pan-American movement, at the
behest of the Roosevelt Administration.1
Overview
Even so, why did the U.S. government become involved in
public diplomacy at all, if it had kept a 150-year-old
1Espinosa, 67-86.
21

22
distance from this instrument of persuasion?

Until the

1930s, J.D. Parks explains, "cultural relations as an
instrument of foreign policy was still alien to Washington's
thinking."2

The United States became aware of the

potential of cultural relations, beginning in 1898, during
Pan-American cultural exchange programs overseen by private
organizations.3

It was not until fifty years later,

however, that the U.S. government made a decision to take an
initial foray into uncharted territory.

The 1938 debut

established a precedent for a dual mission, public diplomacy
as an agent of international goodwill and as an instrument
of U.S. foreign policy, with a direct relationship between
the two: cultural relations were to be used as a peaceful
means to reverse intercultural hostilities of long duration
among peoples of the Americas and to offset Nazi propaganda
in the Western hemisphere.

From the start, cultural

relations were tied to national interest and were never used
solely as apolitical vehicles for the exchange of
information and culture for its own sake.
During the Cold War, cultural relations would perform
in like fashion, but on a grander scale, with refinements
that would tie cultural relations to specific foreign policy

2J.D. Parks, Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: American
and Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917-1958, (Jefferson, N.C.:
McFarland, 1983), 31.
3Espinosa, 7.
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objectives outlined in National Security Council directives.
The Latin American program addressed only general conditions
that threatened national security.
Between the 1938 Latin American Experiment and the Cold
War, several key events, beginning with World War II,
changed the timbre of public diplomacy.

Once cultural

relations were included as part of the propaganda campaign
during World War II, they became instruments of persuasion.
Having crossed the propaganda threshold, public diplomacy
then crossed another, becoming an important means for each
Cold War bloc to achieve specific foreign policy objectives.
Interestingly, one unlikely facet of cultural relations,
performing arts exchanges, made a small, but suitably
dramatic, diplomatic debut as a handmaiden of policy goals.
1938: The Threat and the Response
Buildup of Axis propaganda throughout the hemisphere,
the precipitating cause of the administration's remarkable
about-face on public diplomacy, provided formidable fodder
for change.

With the Nazis making inroads in Latin America,

the U.S. government retired its reservations, scrapped its
tradition of non-involvement, and entered public diplomacy.
President Roosevelt fueled the change when he called for
diplomatic action that would "strengthen the solidarity of
the hemisphere against the Nazi propaganda onslaught."4

4Ibid., 90, 92.
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The cultural initiative sprang into being in alarmed
response to a threat to national security.

Mutual respect,

understanding, and tolerance among peoples of the Americas
were clear concerns.

But it was more alarm bells than

wedding bells that ushered in the pan-American public
diplomacy accord.

As Espinosa tells it: "U.S. diplomats in

Latin America sensed that Nazi influence was strong among
large numbers of German immigrants who had settled in Latin
America [especially in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and
Paraguay], and that its receptivity throughout the area
correlated closely with Hitler's impressive successes in
Europe."5
Why Public Diplomacy?
Three factors--the American executive, a hostile
foreign power, and conditions that appeared to favor that
power (a longstanding intercultural malaise between North
and South America)--conspired to hoist an unlikely
protagonist, cultural relations, to a position of
importance.

Two decades later, similar conditions would

prevail during the Cold War.
President Roosevelt, a popular and charismatic leader,
acted as a vital force in the creation of public diplomacy
policy.

Cultural exchange was selected over other options,

following a virtual command in Roosevelt's Inaugural Address

5Ibid., 89.
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and Pan-American Day Speech:
Never before has the significance of the words 'good
neighbor' been so manifest in international relations.
The essential qualities of a true Pan-Americanism must
be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor,
namely, mutual understanding, and through such
understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's
point of view.
It is only in this manner that we can
hope to build a system of which confidence, friendship,
and good will are the cornerstones....6
Following a 193 6 Pan-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace, called by President Roosevelt, and the
signing of the "Convention for the Promotion of InterAmerican Cultural Relations," cultural exchanges were begun
to carry out the presidential promise.

Twenty years on,

with the signing of the 1958 Lacy-Zarubin Agreement,
President Eisenhower would issue a similar cultural call to
arms.
A hostile foreign power, Adolph Hitler and the Nazis,
also precipitated a need for cultural relations, as Thomson
and Laves relate in the following anecdote:
The need for more active cultural interchange with Latin
America was dramatized from a strange quarter.
"Nothing
could be more fitting than a statue of Adolph Hitler in
the Pan American Union," was the ironic comment of a
Latin American diplomat early in World War I I . "Who
more has been responsible for drawing the American
republics closer together?"7
A decade later, an eerily similar impetus would propel a
reluctant American government to continue its public
diplomacy campaign.

As Thomas Sorensen tells it, "It was

6Ibid., 69.
7Thomson and Laves, 35.
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Stalin who gave the information program a big boost [in
1949]."8

Throughout its fifty-five year-long career,

external crises would promote public diplomacy.
If strong figures and security threats propelled
cultural relations programs onto the world stage, then the
programs themselves proceeded to perform according to a
script that conquered two ills--intercultural distress and
national security concerns--with one pill.

Traditional

diplomacy alone would have been ineffective in addressing
problems in the cultural dimension, whereas information
programs, including overseas broadcasts and libraries, and
people-to-people exchanges, could reach a broad audience and
influence foreign public opinion.
A Cultural Solution
A cultural solution, with a strong emphasis on
promoting messages of peace and understanding, presented
itself as a clever and practical, if unusual, response to
national security threats, for two reasons.

First, decades

of unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America had
fostered charges of imperialism against the U.S., and
subsequent antipathies among the peoples of the Americas
required bilateral solutions in which equal partners
participated freely in mutually agreed joint activities.
Second, long-term intercultural malaise, a product of

8Sorensen, 25.
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centuries o£ mutual hostility and distrust, aggravated by
foreign propaganda, demanded a cultural solution.

During

the Cold War, cultural exchange programs would hold similar
promise.
In 193 8, the U.S. government recognized the need to
counter charges of imperialism, the root causes of which
dated, formidably, to the 16th century.

Espinosa argues:

Up until the last decades of the 18th century, Latin
America and Anglo America were two separate and hostile
worlds.
They were extensions of three centuries of
political, religious, and economic rivalry between Spain
and England, with England determined to frustrate
Spain's acknowledged world power in the 16th and 17th
centuries.
Religious, cultural, and ideological
differences provided the rationale for mutual
ignorance and dislike.9
Unilateral action taken by the U.S. in Latin and
Central America (and the Far East) in the 19th and early
20th-century served further to alienate the two cultures:
The U.S. policy of 'educational reorientation' program
in Cuba and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American War
of 1898, and a similar 'educational reorientation' in
the Philippines, aroused bitter criticism from leaders
in a number of independent nations of Latin America.
In the second decade of the 20th century, U.S. foreign
policy during military occupations of the Dominican
Republic and Haiti and interventions in Central America
by the United States, all unilaterally inspired
"assistance," not mutually planned and developed, did
not decrease the barriers that continued to exist, and
which in the course of the 20th century the U.S.
government falteringly set out to remove.10
After centuries of misunderstanding, and decades of

9Espinosa, 2-3.
10Ibid.
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U.S. intervention/ a prevailing vision of Anglo America, as
seen through the sensibilities of Central and Latin American
peoples, required redress.

Thomson and Laves argue:

To the people of Latin America the United States seemed
distant and alien. At best it appeared indifferent.
The current image of the North American was not that of
the scholar, the artist, the humanitarian, or even the
ordinary, understandable human being.
It was in the
popular view that of a vigorous people, but rude and
crude, avid for money and material goods. Too
prevalently it was symbolized by the invading marine
with his trampling boots or the exploiting and
corrupting capitalist.
Such images were made to order
for the propaganda of Goebbels. They had to be
corrected and humanized if the people of Latin America
were to accept the United States as any sort of 'good
neighbor.'11
The Debut
Bilateral cultural exchange presented itself as the
antidote to the evils of imperialism and cultural distance,
due, in part, to the popularity of the Pan-American movement
which was based on the notion of the co-equality of states.
"It was the Pan-American movement," Espinosa notes, "which
opened the way for initiating a multilateral governmentsponsored inter-American cultural relations program."12

In

1936, the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American
Cultural Relations established a cultural exchange program
which would later serve as a model for Cold War exchanges.
Among other things, the Convention called for "greater
mutual knowledge and understanding of the people and
u Thomson and Laves, 35.
12Espinosa, 3.
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institutions of the countries represented.1,13

Initial

activities were limited to educational exchange and
informational projects.
The cultural programs, with equal exchange between
equal partners, fulfilled the parameters--bilateralism,
reciprocity, and cooperation--governing the goals of U.S.
public diplomacy.

Once set, these parameters proved

resilient enough to define and shape a tradition of U.S.
public diplomacy.

The principle of reciprocity, for

example, set both a national norm and an international trend
that would influence the Cold War (and beyond):
It is a significant fact of history that as we move into
the last quarter of this century the officially
sponsored international cultural relations programs of
the vast majority of the countries of the world
emphasize the principle that cultural relations should
not be competitive but reciprocal, a promising trend
toward a new level of cooperation founded on common
interests and goals.14
Diplomacy on a Shoestring
According to plans, the Division of Cultural Relations
was supposed to be responsible for a host of activities, a
grand vision that was continually checked by budgetary
constraints:
The Division of Cultural Relations was responsible for
international activities relating to the exchange of
professors, teachers, and students; libraries; music,
art, and literature; international radio broadcasts;
and in general the dissemination abroad of the
13Ibid.
14Ibid., ix.

30
representative intellectual and cultural works of the
United States and the improvement and broadening of
the scope of our cultural relations with other
countries.15
Actual Congressional appropriations, totalling $75,000 in
193 9, meant that, of all the activities listed, the budget
only covered expenses for professor and student exchanges
and translations of official publications of the Department
of State.16

Music and art exchanges were temporarily

tabled in order "to give precedence to more essential work."
Later, the initiative would be expanded to include "exchange
of publications, artistic exhibitions, radio broadcasting in
the service of peace, educational films, and the
establishment of special American libraries and reading
rooms, all designed to strengthen closer ties among the
peoples of the hemisphere."17

Educational exchange

received priority, however, and over time the program
expanded greatly, in Latin America and around the globe, as
recorded in an Institute of International Education (HE)
report:
In 1939-1940 there were an estimated 6,670 foreign
students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities; at
the end of the war, in 1945-46, the total was 10,341;
and with the great influx from all parts of the world
after the war, by 1948-1949, the total was over 26,500.
Between 1939-1940 and 1948-49, Latin American students

15Press Releases, Vol XIX, No.461, July 30, 193 8
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 66.
16Espinosa, 124, 132.
17Ibid., 124, 132, 129.
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increased from 1,023 to 5,820.18
Since the beginning, cultural relations have
constituted diplomacy on a shoestring budget.

Almost every

treatment of the subject bears testimony to the fact that
public diplomacy has been continually under-appropriated,
partly because it lacks a constituency.

As early as 1940,

journalist Lewis Hanke of Harper's reported that, while
Congress voted some billions for defense, it slashed the
cultural budget in two.

The appropriation for cultural

relations approximated the cost of one gun sighter on a
battle ship.19

In 1958, The New York Times reported that

the 1959 allocation for cultural programs equalled
$2,415,000, and that "a single intercontinental ballistic
missile cost $2, 000, 000 .1,20

In 1961, W.H.C. Laves

complained that "the program has operated for 7 years at the
annual level of expenditures established in 1954, in spite
of several significant developments which clearly call for
increased financial resources.21

Two score and four years

later, during the Reagan years, when cultural relations
18Institute of International Education, Thirtieth Annual
Report of the Director (New York: Oct.l, 1949), 131-133.
19Louis Hanke, "Plain Speaking About Latin America,"
Harper's, 1940.
20,,U.S. Role in the Arts is found to Have Increased in
Decade since World War II," The New York Times, 1A, 5C.
21Toward a National Effort in International Educational
and Cultural Affairs, a report prepared by Walter H.C. Laves,
at the request of the U.S. Advisory Commisson on Educational
Exchange, U.S. Department of State, 1961.
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enjoyed something of a renaissance, similar conditions would
prevail.

The U.S. appropriation for public diplomacy--$100

million for all educational and cultural programs22 to the
Soviet's $3.5 billion23--may have been sufficient to seal a
widget in a Star Wars rocket.

In a 1991 interview, USIA

officer Richard Kaplan verified that the USIA had been given
$2 million for all 1991 performing arts exchanges.24
A Private-Public Affair
The U.S. approached public diplomacy tenuously and
experimentally, and dabbled on a modest scale, because
cultural diplomacy, long the province of the U.S. private
sector, was largely funded and controlled by the private
sector.

The government was meant to have a secondary role,

Thomson and Laves tell us: "The Division of Cultural
Relations was set up primarily to encourage and assist the
activities of private organizations in transnational
cultural relations."25

The joint private-public initiative

required that the U.S. government cooperate with, and often
take direction from, the major philanthropic, educational,
and cultural entities of the country.

The friction caused

by the joint effort led to a debate over the issue of

22Budget of the United States Government, 1985, 8-184.
23Starr, ix.
24Interview with Richard Kaplan, USIA, March 1993.
25Thoms on-Laves, 31.
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government involvement in, and regulation of, educational
and artistic exchanges.
The private sector balked at the alliance of culture
and foreign policy.

With something as basic as a first-

amendment freedom at stake, artists and scholars involved in
the exchanges resented any government regulations and
prohibitions on expression.

The State Department found

itself without policy or precedent, for instance, when
Frederick Jagel, a well-known tenor, decided to designate
himself "musical ambassador of good will" to Buenos Aires.
The department had yet to hammer out the delicate details of
cultural diplomacy with representatives of the artistic
community,26 but many private-public exchanges proceeded
without a hitch.

A sampling of the programs includes an

exchange of journalists planned by Dean Ackerman of Columbia
University, American Library Association exchanges jointly
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the State
Department, and a 1938 Women's Pan American Good Will
Congress in Houston.

For a thorough and comprehensive

listing of exchanges among countries in the Americas, 19381953, see Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural
Diplomacy: 1938-1948, J. Manuel Espinosa's superb and
definitive text on the subject.
Many in government agreed that the government should
not seek to control the content of exchanges, and that the
26Espinosa, 93-4.
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"artistic diplomats" should serve as cultural, not
political, representatives of the nation.

Ninkovich writes:

"The State Department's perception of a causal connection
between intellectual liberty and a democratic social order
originally caused the founders of the Division of Cultural
Relations to segregate cultural from political affairs,"27
a view supported by Thomson and Laves. "Some officers of the
Division of Cultural Relations and their private advisers
were chary of adopting any 'ulterior' objective for a
program of cultural relations,

[believing that] any implica

tion of a tie-in between cultural interchange and foreign
policy invalidates the effect of cultural activities."28
Others, turning the tables, resented the private
sector's strong voice in the exchanges, and worried that the
government was so hamstrung by its own prohibitions and
budgetary constraints that the benefits of the program would
be significantly compromised:
The Division [of Cultural Relations] was set up in a
political department of the government and was designed
to serve a political purpose. Yet the Division found
itself hedged in at almost every turn by prohibitions;
there were so many activities it could not engage in.
And it languished for lack of funds. At a time when
good-will bomber flights were made to Latin America
at the drop of a hat--well, at least every time a
president was inaugurated there--the Division is forced
to talk big and do little because money was lacking.29

27Ninkovich, 171.
28Thomson-Laves, 43.
29Hanke, 591.
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From the outset, the American public diplomacy program
was complicated by a duality of purpose, a tension between
persuasion and altruism, a condition that was aggravated by
the private-public arrangement and modest budget.

As told

by Thomson and Laves:
During this initial period two divergent views emerged
as to the relation of the governmental program of
cultural relations to United States foreign policy. One
argued that the program should be valid in its own right
and not viewed as an instrument for forwarding political
and economic policy. The other considered it as inevi
tably and closely linked to phases of foreign policy.30
Cultural Relations and Foreign Policy
In 1939, cultural relations functioned as a practical
tool for forging peace in the face of formidable cultural
obstacles.

Cultural relations, touted as "one of the most

practical means of developing peace in the American
Republics" and of forging "a public opinion which would
favor and support a rule of peace," were used as peace
machinery.31

Secretary of State Hull billed the new

cultural relations programs--student and professor exchanges
with Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala--as a
"Way to Peace on the American Continent."32
Cultural relations would continue to be thought of as
peace machinery into the Cold War.

30Thomson and Laves, 43.
31Espinosa, 79.
32Ibid., 80-81, 86.

But as the concept of
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peace itself became tainted with duplicity, with the Soviets
insisting that they were the doves of peace, U.S. peace
machinery rebilled itself as truth machinery, beginning with
President Truman's Campaign of Truth in 1949.
Conclusion
Once precedents were set in Latin America for the use of
cultural relations for national security purposes, it became
difficult to undo the link between public diplomacy and
national security.

Then, as cultural relations were

included in the propaganda efforts of World War II, it
became difficult to undo the link between public diplomacy
and persuasion.

Domestic debate notwithstanding, cultural

relations, following precedent, served the national
interest.

IV
Newsweek
27 September 1943
"Beamed to Europe: OWI's Propaganda Paves the Way
for Military Advances"
Only slightly less important than military preparation
for the invasion of Europe was the paving of the way by
the Office of War Information overseas propaganda.
Of
all the OWI's branches, its Atlantic Operations Radio
Bureau has the most direct contact with the peoples and
governments of enemy and occupied Europe. With the
military now actually on its way in, the effectiveness-or the ineffectiveness--of the radio propaganda during
the last two years will become increasingly evident.
Its worth is, unfortunately, a good deal harder to
measure than that of a military operation.
Operations: The OWI Atlantic radio barrage has now
reached the staggering proportions of 2,600 short-wave
shows a week. These broadcasts keep most of the eighteen
Atlantic short-wave transmitters running full blast 24
hours a day. Programs are now being built, recorded, and
shipped overseas as fast as time can be cleared with the
foreign stations. Although the shows are designed for
consumption in the neutral country itself, some, near the
frontiers of Europe, are heard by the enemy as well.
Policy: Elmer Davis, the director of War Information,
made his over-all propaganda policy clear when he took
office: The best propaganda is the truth. Thus the
great majority of OWI overseas programs are straight
newscasts, only slightly slanted in subject matter to
fit the country at which they are aimed. The typical
newscast is fifteen minutes long. It is introduced
by a brisk band chorus of "Yankee Doodle" and is
identified as "the Voice of America" (the OWI is never
mentioned).
Results: Much of the sniping in Congress and elsewhere
against the OWI overseas radio branch is based on the
claim that there is no certainty that the programs are
listened to in Europe. To refute this, the Atlantic
operations office offers such evidence as a recent
protest from the newspaper Porunca Vremmi, in Nazioccupied Rumania, against 'individuals who from morning to
evening listen to enemy broadcasts... Unfortunately, those
harmful individuals are not only out to satisfy their
morbid curiosity. From one coffee house to another they
spread their 'news,' thus undermining morale.'

THE DEBATE
The transformation of public diplomacy into a
cultural offensive is the story of war- -a world war, a Cold
War, and a virtual domestic war, mostly over the issue of
propaganda.

Over a forty-year span, a debate about the link

between public diplomacy and propaganda was resolved by the
practical demands of winning wars.

Many in private and

public life disliked the idea of using cultural activities
as part of a war effort, but they were used nonetheless.
During World War II, information programs, especially print
and electronic media, were the preferred mode of exchange,
and were used defensively to help win friends and strengthen
alliances.

During the Cold War, the State Department

ingeniously used cultural programs offensively to penetrate
and effect changes within the enemy bloc.
This chapter takes a look at definitions of propaganda,
the debates over propaganda and the polarization of cultural
exchanges, and how these issues affected the evolution of
public diplomacy in the period after the 1938 Latin American
pilot program and before the Cold War.
The Definitions
Information exchange used during World War II qualifies
as a form of propaganda.

Newscasts, in particular, as the

Newsweek article above reports, were part of the campaign of
truthful, or legitimate, propaganda intended to inform
allies and persuade neutral states.
38

The use of propaganda,
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however, has always been controversial in America.
Opposition arose, as also noted in Newsweek, from those who
maintained that the effects of information programs, unlike
military operations, could not be measured, a common
complaint against public diplomacy.
the use of propaganda in general.

Concern also arose over
Hans Tuch explains:

Propaganda is a perfectly appropriate term if used in
its original and correct meaning, dating to 17th cen
tury religious origins.
If one thinks of propaganda
in terms of disseminating ideas and information, there
is no problem in using this word to describe the U.S.
government's information and cultural activities
abroad. But in the English language--at least in
America--propaganda has acquired a pejorative meaning,
referring to the deliberate spreading of lies and false
information.1,1
But propaganda may come in three forms--white, grey,
and black--according to Allen Hansen.

White, or

"legitimate” propaganda, as used by American public
diplomats, is defined as "the spreading of true or accurate
information for what one considers a worthy cause."2
USIA's information campaign,

"Telling America's story to the

world," was a certain use of legitimate propaganda for a
worthy cause, spreading the story of freedom round the globe
and helping to win the Cold War.

Many experts in public

diplomacy defend and support the use of propaganda, or
persuasion, as justifiable and necessary--in this legitimate
form.

Thomas Sorensen, a thirty-year veteran of public

diplomacy, has asserted that "the USIA's purpose should be

xTuch, 9.
2Hansen, 6.
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to persuade, not merely to inform."3 Moreover, "public
diplomats,"

Allen Hansen contends, "are 'propagandists' in

the original meaning of 'propaganda,' i.e., advocates of a
cause--and as such they are 'pioneers' in a relatively new
profession."4

Frederic Barghoorn, Yale professor and

former diplomat to the USSR, has matter-of-factly argued
that cultural programs, much like information programs,
should function "as the manipulation of cultural materials
and personnel for propaganda purposes."5
Since many Americans bristle at the idea of propaganda,
public diplomats have neologized their way round the dilemma
in something of a domestic propaganda campaign to sell
public diplomacy to Americans.

Therefore, the term, public

diplomacy, and the inadequate euphemism, information, are
often used as substitutes for the value-laden term,
propaganda.6

(Here, the terms public diplomacy, cultural

diplomacy, cultural relations, and propaganda, in its
legitimate form, are used interchangeably, although they are
distinct in meaning.

Cultural diplomacy and cultural

relations are a subset of public diplomacy.
course, may embrace all other terms.)

3Sorensen, 25.
4Hansen, 222.
sBarghoorn, 10.
6Starr, 95.

Propaganda, of
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The Debate over Propaganda
American abhorrence of propaganda, and association of
it with Nazi and fascist regimes, gave rise to a debate
about its use in the shaping of public opinion, both at home
and abroad.

As Thomson and Laves explain:

The term propaganda had acquired in the United States
during the 1920s and 1930s a derogatory meaning.
Propaganda was looked upon as a dirty business, which
might be necessary in war but should not be continued in
peace.
It was not considered in accord with the
traditions of American foreign policy. Moreover, there
was fear that the apparatus for propaganda abroad might
be shifted to focus on the American people themselves,
and become a dangerous instrument in domestic political
struggles.7
Legislative steps were taken to meet the public's unease
about government involvement in public diplomacy, and all
propaganda efforts were restricted, by law, to overseas
activities.

According to Hans Tuch:

Even when the necessity for the U.S. government to
conduct public diplomacy was accepted, the Congress
insisted on immunizing the American people from its own
government's propaganda by limiting the government's
activities to telling its story abroad. The distinction
was clear: to this day, the U.S. government's public
diplomacy programs and products cannot by law be
disseminated to the American public.8
But, since public diplomacy must legitimately
propagandize in order to favorably influence foreign public
opinion, the U.S. government, ever sensitive to Americans'
distaste for propaganda in general, sought to justify its
operations, and to answer its citizens' misgivings about the
7Thomson and Laves, 63.
8Tuch, 6.
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enterprise.

Beginning in 1938, the U.S. government issued a

series of disclaimers denying the union of public diplomacy
and propaganda, starting with Chief Cherrington's 1938
definitive statement on the newly created Division of
Cultural Relations:
It is not a propaganda agency, in the popular sense of
the term which carries with it implications of penetra
tion, imposition, and unilateralism.
If its endeavors
are to be directed toward the development of a truer
and more realistic understanding between the peoples of
the United States and those of other nations, it is
believed that such a goal can most surely be attained
by a program which is definitely educational in
character and which emphasizes the essential reciprocity
in cultural relations....9
According to Chief Cherrington, the reciprocity and the
modest kitty of cultural relations were signs that
propaganda was not afoot.

Modest the kitty would remain,

too, for some fifty-five years, as if to perpetuate the
notion that propaganda could not be dispensed on such a
smal1 budge t .
The U.S. government further sought to shield itself
from charges of propaganda and imperialism, both home and
abroad, by its insistence that it was not acting as an
official purveyor of culture.

According to a State

Department spokesman in 1940:
The role of governments in promoting friendly individual
relations among people is necessarily limited. We have
no 'official culture' to sell to any of our neighbors.
The idea, in fact, of an official culture is repugnant
9||The Role of Education in International Cultural
Relations," Department of State Bulletin, I (July 8, 1939),
490-491.
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to us, and it would be equally repugnant to them.
In
the field of human association the role of a government
is to encourage, to cooperate, and to coordinate private
initiative and the initiative of institutions seeking to
broaden the base of cultural appreciation.10
In an attempt to convince the Congress and public that
public diplomacy was necessary and legitimate, public
diplomats dropped the public use of the term propaganda
because of its association with America's historic enemies.
In 1938, as previously noted, the Division of Cultural
Relations denied any tie between cultural programs and
propaganda.

In the 1943 Newsweek article featured at the

beginning of this chapter, the term propaganda is freely
used, perhaps because it is considered to be acceptable
during wartime.

By 1962, however, two articles in Time

magazine, featured in Chapter Six, crowed about the success
of America's cultural offensive, but made no mention of
propaganda.

But it was propaganda nonetheless, mostly

because, as Sorensen has noted, it had to be to succeed.
Why else would the government have bothered at all with
these programs, especially since the private sector had
managed cultural relations well enough for 150 years?

What

should be the role of public diplomacy if hot to favorably
influence foreign public opinion to benefit the national
interest?
Government involvement in cultural exchanges,
10Ellis O. Briggs, "The 1930s--A Decade of Progress in
Inter-American Relations," Department of State Bulletin, II
6 January 1940, 10.
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especially educational, professional, and artistic
exchanges, touched off yet another debate on the
politicization of these programs.

The first of public

diplomacy's two branches, the informational branch,
consisting largely of broadcasts, pamphlets, publications,
overseas exhibits and libraries, has generally been accepted
as a vehicle for legitimate propaganda.

The cultural

branch, however, consisting largely of educational,
scholarly, professional, and artistic exchanges, has not
willingly been accepted as a proper arena for persuasion.
Therefore, informational diplomacy has been linked to
national interests and foreign policy goals, especially
during World War II, while cultural diplomacy has generally
not.

The promotion of U.S. interests and the use of

legitimate propaganda go hand-in-hand, according to the
logic, and neither have a place in cultural activities.
Sorensen explains the dichotomy as follows:
Few question the desirability of cultural and
educational activities abroad, but many question whether
they should be a part of, or have the same objectives
as, the information program.
Some believe that
government-sponsored cultural activities, while
different in method, are identical in purpose to
information activities: the influencing of foreign
attitudes to further U.S. policy goals.
Others believe
that cultural activities serve long-range U.S. interests
in a broad sense, but should not be employed for
tactical propaganda advantage, that they should be
separated from propaganda operations so as not to be
tarnished by them.11
Despite the clarity of the 1963 Sorensen statement, in 1993,
n Sorensen, 71.
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Hans Tuch, a public diplomat whose extensive writings about
his career include the definitive text, Communicating With
the World, said that the issue was still contentious:
There are some among my former colleagues who still
believe that there is something immoral about throwing
educational and cultural activities into the same hamper
with the U.S. government's information programs, that
educational and cultural exchanges are somehow
antithetical to the foreign relations process and our
foreign affairs goals.12
As recently as 1986, at a Hoover Institution Conference on
public diplomacy, scholar Nils Wessell argued that linking
politics and cultural diplomacy was objectionable and
unwise:

"Linking exchanges to political fluctuations

endangers not only the life of the exchanges, but more
importantly, threatens cessation of the benefits accrued to
the U.S."13
Many other issues over the proper role of public
diplomacy in state affairs have arisen, which, though beyond
the present purposes here, give some insight into the
debate.

USIA diplomat Hans Tuch reveals the kinds of

considerations identified by the Department of State, USIA,
Congress, and the executive, during the debate:
Should U.S. public diplomacy address itself to mass
audiences or to the elites in other countries?
Should U.S. public diplomacy concern itself with long
term objectives, creating a climate of understanding for
the United States, or should it concern itself with

12Interview with Hans Tuch, March 1993.
13Starr, 166.
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short-term objectives, such as gaining acceptance for
intermediate-range nuclear forces deployment in Europe?
Should U.S. public diplomacy use primarily "fast" media,
namely, information programs involving press, radio, and
television; or should it work through the "slow" media-cultural and educational exchanges, books, libraries,
exhibitions?
Should U.S. public diplomacy be primarily concerned with
countering communist ideology, or should its principal
objectives be to promote democracy?
Should U.S. public diplomacy represent the policies of
the incumbent administration, or should it reflect
American society in its diversity?14
Propaganda and Necessity; How WWII and the Office of War
Information Shaped the Debate
In 1939, the U.S. Division of Cultural Relations issued
the following declaration about the use of cultural
relations in the event of direct involvement in World War
II: "The Division should be divorced from such propaganda
activities as the Government might find necessary during the
war."15

Disclaimers aside, cultural relations assumed a

mission to persuade as well as inform, and began to function
much like informational programs.

It is difficult to

imagine that cultural relations activities could have
continued unfettered throughout the war, and once the
propaganda threshold was crossed, reversal was unlikely.
Thomson and Laves elucidate:
The character of the cultural program was modified some
what to meet the demands of the war situation.
Such
14Tuch, 13.
15Espinosa, 142 .
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activities as the exchange of journalists and
specialists and the overseas libraries were put under
pressure to produce immediate as well as long-term
effects.
Cultural relations were largely, though not
entirely, viewed as one more channel for propaganda, or
at least as preparing the way for propaganda.16
The OWI's efforts, accomplished by a fledging agency
still sprouting wings, were remarkably successful, given its
modest budget.

"From start to finish," Sorensen reports,

"OWI's Overseas Branch spent $110,800,000, a tiny fraction
of the hundreds of billions spent on the war and only 60
percent of one year's budget of the peacetime USIA in the
late 1960s."17

In mostly unsung efforts, OWI sought to

maintain allied morale, weaken the will of the enemy, and
conspire to shake the enemy's resolve with the following
successful informational efforts: Victory magazine, printed
in six languages, shipped bimonthly to all accessible parts
of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and Q.S. territorial
possessions, with total distribution of 540,000;18 OWI's
"foreign propaganda broadcasts," which short-waved 2,688
programs (80% news) each week toward the rest of the world,
with reported reception in Switzerland, Berlin, Rome, Paris,
Spain and Poland;19 newspapers, such as L'Amerique en
Guerre; the highly successful leaflets known as "safe-

16Thomson-Laves, 55.
17Sorensen, 19.
18,1Taxpayer s' Victory."
19"Anyone Listening?"

Time, 1 February 1943, 52.
Time, 15 March 1943, 50.
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conduct passes" which encouraged honorable surrender of
enemy forces, and the deliverance of the Italian Navy after
repeated and urgent broadcasts by the Voice of America
(VOA) , [and BBC] .20

Moreover, the VOA pulled off at least

one spectacular coup, organized by former OWI official, Leo
Rosten, in which it aired a live broadcast of the bombing of
Berlin and the demise of Radio Berlin as it happened.

As

Rosten told Look magazine:
When it appeared likely that Hitler would broadcast to
the world at 11 A.M., the hour that he became
Chancellor, [January 30, 1943, Hitler's tenth
anniversary in power and Roosevelt's birthday] Rosten
proposed that the RAF bomb Berlin at that precise moment
and knock the Nazi radio off the air while the world
listened. The project went off without a hitch. With
perfect timing, RAF Mosquito bombers hit Berlin a few
seconds after 11 o'clock. Hitler had a sore throat, but
Hermann Goering spoke in his place. A few seconds after
the fat Reichsmarschall began speaking, explosions were
heard in the background.
Shouts and sounds of confusion
followed, then Radio Berlin went off the air. Germany
was not invincible, after all.21
In spite of OWI's successes, its activities fell short
of the expectations of some.
quarters.

Criticism was stern from some

Sorensen complained that "OWI used propaganda as

an instrument of war, but failed completely to develop the
art of persuasion as an instrument of foreign policy."22
Frederic Barghoorn bemoaned the failure of the OWI, and the
U.S. effort in general, to develop cultural diplomacy as a
20Sorensen, 16-19.
21Leo Rosten, "The World of Leo Rosten: The Day I Bombed
Berlin," Look, 8 February 1966, 36.
22Sorensen, 12.
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specialized art: "Cultural diplomacy is so new to the U.S.
that it is doubtful that we will ever be full-fledged
practitioners of this art."23
Nevertheless, public diplomacy learned some lessons
from OWI.

Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur had encouraged

psychological warfare operations in their theaters.24 As
president, Eisenhower would honor the lessons of propaganda
by issuing a call for a continuation of "psychological
warfare" throughout the Cold War.
Cultural Relations in the Post-War Era
Salvos of disclaimers aside, and debate
notwithstanding, cultural relations in the post-war era
would enjoy an importance due to a collection of factors.
After World War II, a series of events, over a dozen years'
time, enabled public diplomacy to build on the pre-war Latin
American blueprint.

The Fulbright Act of 1946, the Smith-

Mundt Act of 1948, Truman's 1949 "Campaign of Truth,"
Eisenhower's creation of the USIA in 1953, the Cold War, the
Lacy-Zarubin Agreement of 1958, and the Soviet propaganda
campaign, all conspired to hoist cultural relations to
prominence as a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
The 1946 Fulbright Act called for an exchange of
students, researchers, and academicians, and led the way to

23Barghoorn, 11.
24Ibid.
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other exchange efforts, including exchanges of youths,
professionals,

trade unionists, and artists.

The Smith-

Mundt Act of 1948, considered to be the legislative origin
of U.S. public diplomacy, authorized the "preparation, and
dissemination abroad, of information about the United
States, its people and its policies through press,
publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information
media, and through information and instructors abroad."25
In the Roosevelt tradition, strong heads of state kept
public diplomacy alive.

Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy each

supported cultural relations.

Peacetime redirection of

propaganda mechanisms and shifts in objectives had been
attempted by the government soon after World War II, but it
was not until 1950, with another war at hand in Korea, that
public diplomacy was redefined by Truman into a "Campaign of
Truth," the stated objectives of which were "to strengthen
cohesion among the countries of the free world, to present
the United States as a worthy partner with whom to
cooperate, to deter Communist aggression, and to help roll
back Soviet influence."26

Truman, in an executive order,

stated that "the nature of present day foreign relations
makes it essential for the United States to maintain
information activities abroad as an integral part of the

25Tuch, 17-18.
26Edward W. Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon (New York: Funk
& Wagnalls, 1953), 78-79.
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conduct of our foreign affairs."27

Truman's Campaign of

Truth--"to see to it that other peoples receive a full and
fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies
of the U.S. Government"--advocated "making ourselves known
as we really are."28
Eisenhower, on whose watch the USIA would begin, spoke
favorably of the fruits of "psychological warfare," and
acknowledged that propaganda had contributed to the war
effort: "The spoken and written word was an important
contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to
resist....

Psychological warfare has proved its right to a

place of dignity in our military arsenal."29
Interestingly, President Eisenhower initiated the
change in peacetime cultural diplomacy from the defensive to
the offensive.

In his 1953 directive, Eisenhower switched

from speaking of psychological warfare as a useful line of
defense during wartime, to speaking of a subtly offensive
means of communication that would ally the U.S. with other
non-communist nations.

He instructed the newly created USIA

"to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of
communication techniques that the objectives and policies of
the United States are in harmony with and will advance their

27Executive Order 9608, issued by President Truman,
31 August 1945.
28Tuch, 115.
29Sorensen, 20.
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legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."30
Instead of using information to undermine the enemy's will
to resist, it would be used to encourage cooperation.
As late as 1961, with passage of the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act, popularly known as the FulbrightHays Act,

"mutual understanding" was still described as the

main goal of cultural relations,31 but President Kennedy
altered the mission of public diplomacy to one of helping
"to achieve United States foreign policy objectives
b y ...influencing public attitudes in other nations."32
Kennedy's presidential directive, which spoke of
influencing, rather than informing, officially married
peacetime cultural relations to foreign policy goals.
Kennedy's directive had some staying power throughout
the Cold War.

The ideas that public diplomacy and cultural

relations must be related to policy to be effective, and
must persuade as well as inform, put the enterprise on solid
enough policy ground to contribute to fighting the Cold War.
Conclusion
At the end of the day, powerful and popular heads of

30Statement by the President, The White House, 28 Oct, .
1953; and "Directive-Approved by the President for the
Guidance of the United States Information Agency," 28 October
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, National Archives and Records
Service (Washington, D.C., 1960), 728.
31Hansen, 19.
32Sorensen, 21.
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state, would intervene to settle a debate that could have
indefinitely hamstrung the public diplomacy effort.
Domestic quibbles over the fate of public diplomacy in the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, were overtaken by events and
overridden by chief executives who marshalled action, as
Roosevelt had in the 1930s.

Additionally, Khrushchev, as

Stalin and Hitler before him, prodded a timid America toward
a cultural commitment.

In a 1957 interview on Face the

Nation, Khrushchev announced that two things, eliminating
trade barriers and increasing the level of cultural
exchanges, would help to normalize relations between the two
superpowers.

"There must be," Khrushchev decreed, "more

contacts between our peoples, between businessmen.

That is

the main thing."33
For better or worse, as early as 1958, with the signing
of the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement and the advent of official
U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange, public diplomacy permanently
changed its spots.

Then, the new policy of Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles favored U.S.-Soviet contact that
would allow the U.S. "to infuse ideas and information into
the USSR."

The State Department began to use cultural

exchange as a means to an end, and much like its Soviet
counterpart, turned its cultural relations program, now
officially worldwide, into "a tool to fight communism.1,34
33Parks, 166.
34Ibid., 4.
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U.S. News & World Report
26 March 1954
Interview with Theodore C. Streibert
"The New /Voice of America'"
Q: People generally think of your agency as the Voice of
America, don't they, Mr. Streibert?
A: Yes, that's true. But, the phrase "Voice of America"
applies only to our radio operations. Our radio service is
an important part of our overseas information program-but
only a part. We also operate a press service, a motionpicture service and information centers throughout the
world.
Q: What is the basic concept of our Information Agency, as
you see it?
A: The basic concept is to make known and interpret the
foreign policies of the United States so that they are
understood by other peoples in terms that are meaningful to
them.
Q: How do you accomplish that?
A: We use all communication techniques to submit evidence to
the people of other nations to show that our objectives and
policies are not only in harmony with their aims, but will
actually advance their own legitimate aspirations for peace,
freedom and progress.
£>: Do you mean that you are just engaged in explaining our
foreign policies--is that all you are doing?
A: No, that is not all--although that, in itself, is a
pretty big order. In addition to that, we have the function
of combating the lies spread by the Communists, to unmask
their deceitful processes, to set straight our real
objectives and motives which are deliberately misinterpreted
by the Communists, to enlist the friendship and support of
people in other nations who have similar aspirations and
objectives to ours.
Qz Then you are anxious to put our case before countries
that are on our side as well as before people who are on the
other side?
A: That's correct. We view this as a two-purpose operation:
one, to combat Communist lies; two, to cement closer ties to
our friends and those who are tending our way and try to
enlist the aid of the so-called 'neutralists.'
Q: You have other means of getting over your story, besides
radio, don't you?

A: Yes, but back of the Iron Curtain, only the radio. But we
should get to the important part of this whole information
operation.
There was some publicity about our libraries
last spring, but even with all that publicity I think there
is still a failure to understand that that's part of our
whole information program.
Q: You still have libraries?
A: We have about 160 libraries all over the world, and they
are more than just libraries. We call them information
centers.
They are cultural centers in that they are the
center of a program of motion-picture showings, of lectures
of various kinds, sometimes concerts by artists who are
available to us, English lessons.
In most of them there are
quite a number of programs--not necessarily daily, but a
number of events each week at least.
Q: Do large number of people use them?
A: They are universally reported as being jammed most of the
time. . .
Q: Do any of your leaflets ever get behind the Iron Curtain?
Is there any way to get them behind there that you know of?
A: We don't engage in that activity. Of course, some get
into the Russian zone, both from Berlin and from Vienna.
You probably saw the baby pamphlets that were strung up in
our Vienna information center. The Russians objected, but
that was fine--that just gave them more advertisement.
Q: What were these pamphlets?
A: These were pictures of odd baby expressions with anti
communist captions on them.
£>: Do you give a balanced view of this country, the good and
the bad?
A: We do in our news presentations, yes. It wouldn't have
credibility if we didn't. Particularly on the radio.
Qz How much has this program cost?
A: The appropriations have been as high as 120 million
dollars. Now we are down to 75 million.
It is a very bad
thing to be so inconsistent with this. It's like adverti
sing and publicity--you have to be continuous to get the
full effects.
To be up and down and in and out is very
wasteful.
Qz And there is the basic questions of why this should be
going on anyway. Why should the Government be concerned
about what other people think about us?
A: That is a very good question and, it seems to me, has a
very definite answer. As long as we are going to be leaders
in the free world, we are going to have to have a voluntary
coalition of support.

THE LEGACY
Cold War public diplomacy built on the Latin American
precedent in its efforts to break through the cultural
barriers of fear and hostility/ and to combat unwelcome
propaganda. As USIA Chief Streibert noted in the US News &
World Report interview, the informational programs, under
USIA jurisdiction, were designed to fight communism and win
friends.

Some might say that nothing much had changed since

the U.S. first entered the public diplomacy arena in the
1930s.

Then, as in the Cold War, perceived threats to

national interest pressed a reluctant U.S. government into
an activity which, in the 193 8 words of George Messersmith,
it "would perhaps prefer not to do."1
Some things did change, however.

In twenty-five years,

the U.S. became increasingly more sophisticated at waging
what Thomas Sorensen calls a word war, and in developing
what Frederick Barghoorn labels a cultural offensive.
Cultural relations in the Cold War gained a specificity of
purpose, changing from a blunt instrument generally designed
to promote and protect the national interest in the 1930s,
into a refined instrument carefully planned and executed to
advance specific foreign policy goals.
Cultural Relations as a Means to Foreign Policy Ends
Cultural relations in the Cold War assumed prominence
lHThe Cabinet: Culture Division," Time, 8 August 1938, 8.
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because they provided a means by which each bloc could
pursue its foreign policy goals.

While the goals of each

differed substantially, and perhaps because they did so,
each bloc had a common interest in cultural exchange as a
means to achieve them.

Listed below are the American goals,

taken from NSC 5607, and Soviet goals as constructed by Yale
Richmond, a thirty-year veteran of the Department of State's
U.S.-Soviet cultural program.

While they may seem grand,

U.S. goals support the claim that cultural relations were
part of the grand strategy to fight communism.
American Objectives2
1.

Open the Soviet Union to Western influences in order to
change its foreign and domestic policies; promote
evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union.

2.

Remove barriers currently obstructing the free flow of
information and ideas.

3.

Increase the Soviet bloc's knowledge of the outer world
so that their judgments are based on fact rather than
communist fiction.

4.

Encourage freedom of thought.

5.

Stimulate demand for greater personal security
citizens.

6.

Encourage desire for more consumer goods.

for bloc

Soviet Objectives3
1.

Gain access to U.S. science and technology.

2.

Receive recognition of achievement in transforming a
backward agricultural country into a modern industrial
state.
2NSC 5607, 29 June 1956.
3Richmond, 4-6.

(Please see Appendix A.)
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3.

Demonstrate Soviet achievement, most notably in
performing arts, as high achievements of the communist
system.

4.

Earn foreign currency (especially through world class
artists).

5.

Promote Soviet views abroad and be accepted by the U.S.
as a co-equal.
Cold War U.S.-Soviet cultural relations necessarily

differed from the Latin American cultural exchanges in
several aspects.

First, histories differed.

U.S.-Soviet

cultural relations had enjoyed two centuries of friendly
cultural relations choreographed by the private sector,
interrupted only by a period of enmity after 1917.

Latin

and North American cultural relations had suffered centuries
of enmities, followed by a brief period of cultural
rapprochement.

Second, the scope of the operation changed.

The sheer magnitude of the totalitarian Soviet propaganda
system meant that the U.S. government had to increase its
involvement in cultural exchange, in spite of resistance
from competing centers of power, including Congress,
academia, and traditional diplomats within the State
Department.

Third, the nature of the endeavor differed.

U.S.-Soviet exchange required a competitive partnership with
the very force over which the U.S. sought to triumph,
whereas the Latin American experiment had consisted of a
partnership designed to resist an outside force. Hitler and
the Nazis.

Fourth, goals were refined.

U.S.-Soviet

exchange, unlike the Latin American liaison, functioned as a
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means for the U.S. to achieve specific policy objectives, as
outlined in the 1956 NSD 5607.
changed.

And last, the medium

Performing arts exchanges, which each bloc saw as

means to foreign policy ends, assumed a central role in Cold
War public diplomacy.
A Legacy of Friendship
In the 1950s, as Washington gradually came to view
cultural relations as tools of both foreign policy and
diplomacy, the United States had acquired some 20 years of
experience in cultural exchange, a certain benefit in
matching cultural muscles with the Soviet state-run
propaganda machine.

More importantly, perhaps, the Soviet-

American exchanges had a legacy of centuries of friendship
on which to build a 20th century relationship.

Since the

18th century, the U.S. and USSR had enjoyed an amiable
cultural exchange, ruptured only by the Russian Revolution
of 1917.

Author and historian J.D. Parks explains the

historical basis for the Cold War accord:
Cultural friendship was even older than political amity.
Long before the two governments exchanged ambassadors,
learned men from both countries noted the achievements
of the other, exchanged information of scientific
interest and traded memberships in scholarly
societies.4
Books, music, and performing artists, in addition to
scholarly and scientific exchange, traveled back and forth
through the 1800s, with a clear, persistent, pattern
4Parks, 7.
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emerging: while Russian artists entertained American
audiences, Parks notes, Russians urged their countrymen to
study and emulate American technological efficiency.

The

pattern would repeat itself in Cold War cultural diplomacy.
Soviet artists softened up the West even while Soviet
students and professionals eagerly sought scientific and
technological know-how.

From the 1800s until 1917, Russia's

greatest artists, many in the field of dance, including Anna
Pavlova, Fokine, Nijinsky, the Diaghilev Ballet, and the
Bolshoi Ballet, dazzled American audiences.5
Until the 20th century, neither government actively
promoted official cultural exchanges, but neither erected
obstacles either.

American heads of state were even known

to correspond with Russian czars and czarinas.

For example,

in the 1780s, George Washington and John Adams, responding
to Catherine the Great's request for assistance in compiling
a dictionary of comparative languages, provided the empress
with information concerning native American dialects.6
s

Thus, the cultural and educational Cold War exchanges
had a long-standing legacy on which to build, unlike the
Latin American exchanges, which toddled off on little
historical footing.

Moreover, the tradition of performing

arts exchanges proved to be a viable heritage on which to
5Ibid., 8-9.
6Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov, "The American Philosophical
Society and Early Russian-American Relations," Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society (December, 1950), 556.
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build, allowing each side to pursue its objectives.

The

USSR showcased its greatness and earned much-desired
dollars, and the U.S. attempted to open up the USSR, remove
cultural barriers, and increase the Soviet public's
knowledge of the outside world.7
20th Century Enmities
If 18th- and 19th- century legacies made cultural
exchange possible, 2 0th- century enmities made them
improbable.

A tradition of amity notwithstanding, the 1958

golden egg of cultural exchange could only hatch after
considerable mutual hostility was overcome.
From 1917 to the 193 0s, in the wake of the Russian
Revolution, the U.S. upheld a "non-recognition policy"
toward the USSR.
Moscow.

Official Washington did not speak to

The U.S. private sector kept contact, however,

providing among other things, famine relief and
technological aid.

During Stalinist rule, 1934-1953,

official recognition between governments was renewed, but
cultural relations waned, a trend broken only during World
War II.

Stalin increasingly isolated the Soviet people from

outside contacts and purged Soviet cultural life of western
influences.

He instituted the policy of Socialist Realism,

an officially sanctioned state art form, and turned the
nation's cultural organs into weapons to attack bourgeois

7Interview with Irene Carstones, USIA, Cultural Officer
for U.S.-USSR Cultural Exchanges, 1950s-1980s, March 1993.
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civilization.

The U.S. government responded by erecting its

own barriers, restricting contacts with communists and
conducting a national anti-communist campaign, thus ensuring
the estrangement of the American and Soviet people.8

In

1962, Sergei Romansky, chairman of the Committee for
Cultural Relations with

Foreign Countries in USSR,

complained that, except

for the exchange of one actor, there

had been an absolute absence of U.S.-USSR cultural relations
between World Wars I and II.9
Concomitantly, and ironically, as political relations
plunged, the U.S. began

to change its attitude toward

cultural relations as part of a foreign policy agenda.

The

Department of State, the new thinking went, could be used as
a promotor and coordinator of cultural activities, though
not as a purveyor of an official American culture.

(The

notion of an American state culture was as much an anathema
to U.S. officials as, say, a state religion was to U.S.
founders.)

In contrast, all Soviet culture that conformed

to the state policy of Socialist Realism, was official
culture.

"Washington's desire and ability to manipulate

cultural contacts for state purposes was limited in relation
to Moscow's," Parks explains, but "Moscow organized and
controlled its cultural contacts with foreign nations in

8Parks, 9, 3.
9William Benton, "Should We Continue the Cultural Ex
changes with the USSR?" Saturday Review, 27 October 1962, 17.
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accordance with state policies and plans,"10 a lopsided
match that would create an interesting cultural contest.
During Stalin's tenure, the U.S. government approached
the USSR with offers of cultural relations, to no avail.
After Stalin's death in 1953, Moscow, as it had in the
1920s, made overtures to Washington for cultural exchange.
A reticent U.S. government acquiesced in spite of incidents
that conspired against it, including an acrimonious 1955
Geneva Conference at which cultural exchange was to have
been inaugurated, the intolerable 1956 Hungarian crackdown,
and domestic debate.

After Stalin's death, John Foster

Dulles, an influential American Secretary of State,
propelled American public diplomacy toward the 1958
agreement.

Parks tells us:

The only contacts with the Soviets that Secretary of
State Dulles favored during the fifties, were those that
allowed the United States to infuse 'ideas and informa
tion' into the Soviet Union in order to encourage the
Soviet people to resist their rulers. Washington,
too, had learned to use cultural relations as a means to
an end.11
A Clash of World Views
The cultural contest was a form of cultural detente, a
marriage of convenience, in the sense that each side
tolerated and accommodated the other in order to meet its
own needs.

While each side approached cultural exchange

10Parks, 3,4.
""Ibid., 4.
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with some trepidation, expectations outweighed risks, and
each willingly submitted to a clash of intellectual
ideologies.

Each side took risks in so doing, as Professor

Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University, an organizer of
academic exchanges, explains:
Academic exchanges raise a dilemma for us because formal
exchange agreements undermine free trade in ideas,
increase the role of our government over intellectual
activity, and grant legitimacy to governments that deny
the freedoms essential to civilized life. However, they
raise an even more acute dilemma for the Soviet
government, desperately eager to obtain advantages from
cultural exchanges and economic relations but fearful of
the infections these relationships bring into their
controlled society and into Eastern Europe as well.12
Each bloc was willing to suspend considerable misgivings,
not only because expected policy benefits outbalanced
possible risks, but also because cultural relations promised
to be a means by which each could promote its world view.
The clash of world views is apparent in the distinct
objectives of each, as listed on page fifty-seven.

If

ideology is a culture's intellectual style, as Frank
Ninkovich contends, then the U.S. laissez-faire ideology and
USSR command ideology led, respectively, to a free
intellectual interchange and a controlled intellectual
exchange.

The U.S., conforming to what Ninkovich calls the

cultural idealists, set its objectives according to a
cardinal conceit that the glorious ideas governing America
could transcend cultural boundaries and penetrate Soviet
12Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges,
1958-1975 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U. Press, 1976), 120.
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society.

Five out of six U.S. objectives embrace a

philosophical idealism, and bespeak a confidence that
enlists cultural exchange to affect great change.

"To

promote evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union," for
instance, is no small goal.
Conversely, the Soviets' objectives, conforming to the
beliefs of what Ninkovich calls the cultural materialists,
for whom "ideas travel by slow freight," principally fixated
on gains in national prestige and material wealth.

Their

goals embraced a more conventional use of propaganda,
glorification of the state, whereas the American effort,
with high moral sonority, rose above state aggrandizement.
Khruschev's statement, "We will bury you," was borne by the
U.S. with a cavalier confidence that American ideals would
triumph, if in small part, through a cultural re-edification
process. The Soviets, too, had lofty ideas about the triumph
of their world view, but, as cultural materialists, the goal
was grounded by preoccupation with state glory.

The

Soviets' prodigiously different attitude toward propaganda
is reflected in their objectives, evidence of an almost
shameless quest for national acceptance, wealth, and
recognition, financed with a billion-ruble enterprise that
fiscally bested its American counterpart 10 to 1.

The

cultural idealism inherent in the American vision of a
triumphant world view meant that telling America's story to
the world--its ideas of freedom and liberty--superseded
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state reification.
Had the objectives of each side not been distinct,
cultural exchange might not have been so attractive.

Had

the Soviets, for example, wanted to remove barriers to the
free flow of information, change U.S. internal policy, and
promote freedom of thought, as the U.S. did, the clash of
ideologies might have been too apparent to allow
accommodation.
The Kremlin's materialist ideology necessarily led to a
congregation of cultural and political affairs, whereas the
United States' cultural idealism led to a segregation of
cultural and political affairs.

To match the formidable

Soviet propaganda machine, the U.S. was compelled to
continue its experiments in cultural exchange, to overcome
its aversion to propaganda, and to win its domestic battle
over the politicization of public diplomacy.

But

Washington's resistance to becoming "St. Petersburg on the
Potomac"13 continued with a persistence that rivalled the
squabbles during the Latin American experiment, World War
II, and post-war era.

To legitimize its stepped-up Cold War

public diplomacy, the U.S. government framed its initiative
in grand, supra-national objectives.
Domestic opposition to U.S. public diplomacy continued,
from the usual quarters--Congress, a faction within the
State Department, and the American public.
13Byrnes, 7 .

Winning
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Congressional support was always a struggle because public
diplomacy has never had a large domestic constituency.
Opposition also recurred over the issue of propaganda, and
over a certain presentiment that, if the U.S. entered a
-t’

democratic-totalitarian cultural contest with the USSR, it
would be compelled to match the totalitarian cultural
aerobics of the Soviets.

Very early in the Cold War, a

23 May 1945, dispatch from George Kennan, Assistant
Secretary of State, who opposed East-West cultural exchange,
cast a cloud of gloom over the fate of cultural exchange
with the Soviets:
Insuperable obstacles confront even the most rudimentary
cultural interchange. As long as a rigid police control
effectively shields all but a tiny group of Russians
from contact with foreign influence, cultural exchanges
between the Soviet Union and other countries will be
held to a minimum.
It is dangerous to permit the
impression to grow in American intellectual circles that
a large increase in cultural contacts is technically
possible and is favored by the Soviet Government.14
U.S. misgivings were due as much to a laissez-faire
inclination as to a moral belief that it was politically
inconsistent to condemn a state but interact with its
people.

Further, the American view of the illiberal Soviet

relationship between state and individual, and the
subordination of the individual to the state, led Washington
to the justifiable view that, not only was the Soviet state
using its people as pawns to glorify itself, but the
exchanges could be misperceived as sanctioning the practices
14Ninkovich, 108-109.
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of the Soviet regime.

In the end, the hope of benefits to

the U.S. from people-to-people exchange overrode this
concern.
A movement was also afoot that favored a confrontation
with communist propaganda.

In the extreme, it came in the

form of a 2 February 1959 New Leader article by Diana
Trilling.

The Soviet Union had declared "cultural war on

us," she stated, and "one must proceed with caution and
acuteness, with the knowledge, indeed, that our lives are at
stake."15

Likewise, the former Ambassador to the USSR,

Averell Harriman, is reported to have given the following
words to the wise:

"As important as any fact in the field

of foreign policy today, and perhaps much the most
important, is the fact that the Russians have declared
psychological war on the United States, all over the world.
It is a war of ideology and a fight unto the death."16
Many officials called for "a worldwide offensive to
expose the spurious intellectual and ideological appeal of
Communism."17

In spite of Congressional objections that a

cultural offensive would only impel the Kremlin to further
obstructionism, the mood was right for a policy change,
according to Frederick Barghoorn, Press Attache to Moscow,
from 1943 to 1947:
15Barghoorn, 3 .
16Ninkovich, 135.
17Sorensen, 54.
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There was a growing conviction that, while democratic
societies could not and would not wish to tailor the
truth to political ends, they should make a more
vigorous effort to refute Soviet propaganda distortions
and to achieve more effective communication with the
people of communist-ruled lands.18
The National Security Council and Public Diplomacy
With the advent of the USIA in 1953, a subtle
triangular alliance among the executive, the National
Security Council, and the USIA developed.

The relationship

worked to strengthen the cause of public diplomacy and
muffle opposition with directives from the National Security
Council, as endorsed by the President:
The President today approved the recommendation of the
National Security Council that the United States should
seek exchanges between the United States and the
countries of Eastern Europe including the USSR along the
lines of the seventeen point program put forward by the
Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva in October 1955.
Although this program was unacceptable to the Soviet
Government at that time, the President believes that
such a program, if carried out in good faith and with
true reciprocity, may now contribute to the better
understanding of the peoples of the world that must be
the foundation of peace.19
President Eisenhower effected the change, establishing
a strong link between the USIA and the NSC.

According to

Sorensen: "Eisenhower, after urging greater Congressional
support for USIA in his 1955 State of the Union Message,
invited [USIA Chief] Streibert to attend meetings of the
National Security Council as an observer and made him a full
18Barghoorn, 7.
19Press Release from The White House, by James C. Hagerty,
Press Secretary to the President, June 29, 1956.
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member of the Operations Coordinating Board."20 When asked
"To whom do you report? Who is your real boss?" Theodore C.
Streibert, Director of the USIA, replied, respectively, "I
report to the National Security Council, through that to the
President.

The Security Council is really an advisory body,

so that my real boss is the President."21
Although Eisenhower often deferred to Dulles, a gradual
shift to a powerful NSC, which would later solidify during
the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon terms, provided needed
support for public diplomacy.

Shortly after its inception

in 1947, the NSC began to influence cultural relations,
calling for it to play an active role in foreign policy:
Alive to the apparent crucial role of ideas, in December
1947 the fledgling NSC called for coordinated
information programs 7to influence foreign opinion in a
direction favorable to U.S. interests and to counteract
effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7 The demands for an
active approach grew even stronger a few months later
when the NSC ordered the State Department to 7develop a
vigorous and effective ideological campaign.7
Militarily and politically, U.S. policy may have been
operating on the principle of containment, but at the
cultural level it was speeding toward the apocalypse.22
Clearly, according to NSC-inspired wisdom, containment
alone was incomplete without a cultural component.

On 29

June 1956, the National Security Council issued NSC 5607,
"East-West Exchanges," a National Security Council statement

20Sorensen, 82.
21,1Interview with Theodore C. Streibert: The New 7Voice
of America,7" U.S. News & World Report, 26 March 1954, 64.
22Ninkovich, 135-136.
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of policy.

As Yale Richmond argues, "This document, couched

in the Cold War rhetoric of the time, was to serve, without
revision, as the basic U.S. government policy statement on
East-West exchanges through the 1970s, and perhaps
beyond."23

NSC 5607 in turn is based on The 17 Points from

the Geneva Conference of 1955 (See Appendix B) , the document
which the Soviets originally rejected.

(Although it is

beyond the present purposes of this thesis, it is
interesting to note that, in 1983, during President Reagan's
tenure, the NSC would issue a directive, NSDD-77, which
described public diplomacy as "those actions of the U.S.
Government designed to generate support for our national
security objectives," thus tightening its jurisdiction over
cultural and informational programs.)
Indeed, NSC 5607 contains part of the secret of EastWest exchange success.

According to the document, cultural

exchanges provided an excellent vehicle for implementation
of "positive" U.S. foreign policy.

Policy Consideration #8,

"East-West Exchanges," cited cultural exchange as an
"offensive" foreign policy that could succeed in promoting a
desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and
security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence
of the satellites, as contrasted to the "defensive" policy
of containment by force.

This policy, engineered by the

executive, endowed public diplomacy with enough legitimacy
“ Richmond, 6.
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to survive by officially linking its activities to national
security, a cause that rallied enough Congressional funding
to keep public diplomacy afloat.
Conclusion
NSC recommendations, executive approval, public
opinion, and favorable press coverage, all conspired to
hoist cultural exchange to a position of prominence during
the Cold War.

Beginning in 1954, the U.S. press issued

calls to cultural arms.

With seeming envy, Time reported,

"The Russians have launched one of their periodic offensives
of cultural chuminess with the West," a chuminess that
included exchanges with France, Canada & United Kingdom, but
not the U.S.24 Newsweek asked, "Now that Soviet culture
seems to be spreading, how about visits to the U.S.?"25

A

State Department publication applied pressure and humor to
coax reluctant parties into backing East-West exchange:
With over 1,000 delegations entering and leaving the
Soviet Union in 1954, cultural exchange is assuming a
major position in the Communist propaganda effort.
Coming after a period when cultural traffic across the
Iron Curtain had been virtually at a stand still, the
expansion of the last two years appears spectacular.
It
should be remembered, however, that the Soviet Union is
still no land of tourism and that the total number of
people allowed to enter the Soviet Union in the last
year is fewer than the Duchy of Luxembourg would
expect in a moderately good season.26
24"Muscovite Music Hall," Time 63, 10 May 1954, 72.
^"Moscow's New Tune," Newsweek 43, 10 May 1954, 90.
26,,Soviet Cultural Exchange -- A One-Way Street," Notes:
Soviet Affairs, Number: 165, 24 January 1955, 1.
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By 1956, the White House released this press report:
THE WHITE HOUSE
The President today approved the recommendation of the
National Security Council that the United States should
seek exchanges between the United States and the
countries of Eastern Europe including the USSR along the
lines of the seventeen point program put forward by the
Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva in October 1955.
Although this program was unacceptable to the Soviet
Government at that time, the President believes that
such a program, if carried out in good faith and with
true reciprocity, may now contribute to the better
understanding of the peoples of the world that
must be the foundation of peace."27

27White House Press Release, James C. Hagerty, Press
Secretary to the President, 29 June 1956, USIA Library, 1.
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Time Magazine
February 10, 1958
"The Big Swap"
Ever since the summit conference at Geneva in 1955
the U.S. and Russia have been trying to work out a
cultural exchange agreement. Last week, after three
months of negotiations, they signed one which, if
carried out in good faith, might be an important
"beginning of a beginning" (as Senate Majority Leader
Lyndon Johnson put it). Under its terms the two
nations undertake, during 1958 and 1959, to swap:
* Radio and television programs on science, industry,
agriculture, education, public health, sports and
carefully censured international political topics.
* Recordings of folk, classical and contemporary music
* Up to six of each other's writers, six composers,
four painters or sculptors, plus delegations of
student editors and professional women.
* An unspecified number of commercial films (current
U.S. films have been scarce in Russia since 1948),
plus twelve to 15 documentaries.
* Singers Roberta Peters and Blanche Thebom and
Conductor Leopold Stokowski, the Philadelphia
Orchestra for Soviet Pianist Emil Gilels and
Violinist Leonid Kogan (who are in the U.S. now),
plus the Bolshoi Ballet and other stellar attractions.
* Four delegations of college professors to study the
other's educational system; up to 2 0 students from
Moscow and Leningrad universities to attend U.S.
universities for a year and vice versa.
As far as it went, the U.S.-Russia cultural exchange
agreement went a good way. But measured against the
idea--or even the U.S. Government's original minimum
conditions--it left much to be desired.
It failed to
1) bind the Russians to stop jamming U.S. broadcasts
into Russia, 2) give the U.S. some minimum uncensored
access to Russia's controlled press and radio and tele
vision to match the uncensored play Russia gets daily
in the U.S., or 3) stop Russia from declaring much of
its country off base to U.S. visitors; a ban that is
reciprocated by the U.S. in regard to Russian visitors.

THE SWAP
As Time reported, the "Big Swap" began in 1958 with
lofty missions of international cooperation and freer flow
of information between warring blocs.

The agreement, known

informally as The Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement after those who
signed it, began with an opening statement by W.S.B. Lacy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, in which he
heralded the beginning of an East-West cultural accord:
I welcome here today the Soviet delegation, headed by
Ambassador Zaroubin, to discuss with us in a series of
meetings, ways and means to develop and increase
contacts in the technical, scientific, and cultural
fields between the peoples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
Those of us assembled here are not strangers to each
other in this effort.
It is my hope that by sitting
down together in an informal way we may be able to reach
some new understanding and common approach to the
problems involved in exchange -- not only in exchanging
scientists, technicians, entertainers, athletes and the
like, but exchange of information and ideas, which in
our opinion is not only the necessary ingredient to a
better understanding between all peoples, but leads also
to a lessening of tensions and to the development of
international cooperation. Progress in the removal of
barriers, currently obstructing the free flow of
information and ideas, is an important objective of my
Government in these talks.1
The 1958 agreement built on the aims of 1930s U.S.
public diplomacy in its efforts to break through the
cultural barriers of fear and hostility and to combat
unwelcome propaganda.

Most especially, by reaching a broad

lnOpening Statements of United States and U.S.S.R.
Representatives on Technical, Scientific and Cultural
Exchanges," Department of State Press Release No. 597,
28 October 1957, 1.
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audience through the popular press in each country, the
exchange programs were meant to promote U.S. goals by
influencing Soviet public opinion.

But the Latin American

experiment, in which performing arts exchanges took a back
seat to educational exchange, may have been an inadequate
dress rehearsal for the U.S.-Soviet Cold War cultural circus
in which performing arts exchanges took center stage.
The Big Swap was an exercise in extremes: anecdotes on
hardships and failures are matched by tales of prodigious
success.

That U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange happened at all

is remarkable; that it was a tough go is not surprising.
U.S. government-sponsored cultural exchanges performed in
spite of risks to and impediments from both Soviet and
American sources.
Accounts of Russian intransigence are legion.

A

certain epic forbearance saw American diplomats through
Sisyphean struggles with Soviet cunning, tactics which
included the jamming of radio broadcasts, the censoring of
media programs, advance sniping in the press, and
restrictions on travel within the USSR, all of which mostly
afflicted informational exchange.

These problems, as cited

in the Time magazine article, never were conquered,
rendering information exchange less effective than had been
hoped.
Soviet tactics, far short of subtle, did not always
have the intended effect, however.

Almost three million
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Soviets, for instance, pushed through the gates of the
American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, an annual
informational fair which featured all things American.
Advance sniping in the Soviet press, designed to destroy the
credibility of the American display, did little to keep the
Soviet public from clammering for information about America,
much to Soviet authorities' dismay.2

Yale Richmond has

said that the Soviets regretted taking the risk that the
informational exchanges posed because they were too popular
with the Soviet public:
The USIA exhibitions have had a phenomenal success
in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet authorities
probably wished they had never agreed to them, for
they have attempted several times to delete them from
the cultural agreement.3
Although they signed an official cultural exchange agreement
biannually, beginning in 1958, the Soviets attempted to keep
U.S. government involvement to a minimum, and struck deals
with both private and public American sectors, enjoying the
best of both worlds.4

For example, the Soviets cut deals

with the likes of impresario Sol Hurok whenever the U.S.
government terms were inconvenient for them.

The U.S.

government required reciprocity and relaxation of travel
restrictions, terms which the Soviets were loathe to honor
and which private American agents could not demand.
2Barghoorn, 12.
3Richmond, 26.
4Ibid., 13.
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The Saturday Review reported:
Naturally, our officials say, the Soviets like to build
up their profit potential by dealing privately with
impresarios such as Mr. Sol Hurok, who manages the
Soviet troupes in the U.S. Our U.S. officials protest
when the Soviet Ministry of Culture claims it can book
the New York City Ballet into only five Soviet cities
for eight weeks this fall; meanwhile, Mr. Hurok is
booking the Bolshoi Ballet into nine American cities for
thirteen weeks.5
But the Soviets' shuffle around the official agreement
and alliance with Sol Hurok, was partly encouraged by
internal wrangling in the U.S.

If the Soviets were

intransigent, some key American contingents were
uncooperative, so much so that public diplomacy was almost a
casualty of the democratic process.

The House of

Representatives consistently allocated only minimal funds
for public diplomacy, and a Senate majority, led by Senator
Fulbright, supported government funding of public diplomacy,
but opposed government regulation, and politicization, of
cultural exchange.

Factions within the State Department--

those for and against the use of cultural diplomacy for
foreign policy objectives--continued to bicker over the role
of public diplomacy.

Consequently, many performing arts

exchanges occurred outside of the official agreement due to
both Soviet and American political shenanigans.

As

Frederick Barghoorn tells it:
It should be noted that less than half of the American
5Benton, William, "Should We Continue the Cultural
Exchanges with the USSR?" Saturday Review, 27 October 1962,
19-20.
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artists or art groups that performed in the Soviet Union
after 1954 were financed directly or indirectly by the
United States Government.
The Ed Sullivan Show and
Holiday on Ice, for example, were purely private
ventures, from the financial point of view, although the
negotiations for these and other ventures involved
official Soviet-American dealings.
Opinion is divided
in competent American circles as to whether or not the
role of government, on our side, should be greater than
it usually has been, or whether a free enterprise system
in cultural and entertainment fields is compatible with
a decisive government role in policy for exchanges.6
In 1961, a new administration ordered a study of the
cultural diplomacy program and suspended it for six months,
just as American artists were staging a virtual cultural
coup d'etat in the USSR.

Concomitant to the Cuban blockade,

the exchanges were temporarily derailed, Newsweek reported,
due in part to "sharp criticism, especially in Congress, of
both the purpose and administration of the Cultural
Presentations program.1,7

Though a blow to public

diplomacy, the hiatus would end in a decision to promote
performing arts exchanges as the exchange of choice.
American diplomats submitted to the vagaries of Soviet
cultural sleight-of-hand, mostly because they had only two
choices, according to J.D. Parks; "to accept Moscow's
methods and to maintain contacts in a restricted and limited
manner, or to reject both the method and the contacts."8
In 1958, the U.S. chose the former because it came to view

6Barghoorn, 317.
7"Exchange Examined," Newsweek, 14 January 1963, 64.
8Parks, 5.
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cultural relations, the so-called "cultural offensive," as a
means to foreign policy and national security ends.

This

commitment pitted democratic American public diplomacy
against totalitarian Soviet propaganda.

The Soviets were

characteristically keen and shrewd competitors, as Assistant
Secretary of State William Benton reported in 1962: "Most
Westerners in Moscow say the Soviet Ministry of Cultural
Relations is the most slippery and unreliable of all the
Soviet Ministries with which to deal.”9 And as Richmond
contends, "Cultural exchange was seen as another aspect of
competition by the Soviets in which the stronger
triumphs. "10
A Drama of Peace and Truth
Informational and cultural exchange, standard bearers
of goodwill between the two nations, were not free of
periodic transcontinental dramas.

Two rivals, Peace and

Truth, went head to head in the cultural show.

While both

sides talked of peace and cooperation, the Soviets, early
on, appropriated the peace theme and its traditional symbol,
the dove, which they paraded in every available venue.
William and Mary professor Alan Ward recalls that a 1950s
London concert of the Red Army Chorus was advertised with
posters that featured a dove of peace.

9Benton, 20.
10Richmond, 18.
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Barghoorn adds, were particularly skilled at projecting the
image of themselves as peacemakers:
Soviet exploitation of cultural contacts has usually
revolved around the strategy and propaganda of peaceful
coexistence. Soviet leaders have always insisted that
their professed enthusiasm for international contacts
was proof of their devotion to peace. This is an
appealing thesis, for most people do tend to associate
friendly personal contacts with hopeful prospects for
peace.11
In response, the United States continued its truth theme,
begun with Truman's "Campaign of Truth" in 1950.
motto,

The USIA

"Truth is our greatest weapon," informed all

informational exchange.

The U.S. informational enterprise--

"to depict U.S. society as truthfully as possible, warts and
all"--was to be "honest to be credible."12

"Little by

little," President Eisenhower predicted, "mistrust based on
falsehoods will give,way to international understanding
based on truth."13
While the U.S. trafficked in truth, the Soviets
misappropriated the language of peace, an exercise in
equivocation that included a stockpile of doublespeak which
distorted the basic terms on which U.S.-Soviet cultural
agreements were founded.

As Frederick Barghoorn, one-time

Press Attache and Ambassador to Moscow, tells it:
We must remember, of course, that Soviet communists,
like all communists, use words in unusual ways.
It is
^Ibid., 15.
12Personal Interview with Hans Tuch, March 1993.
12The New York Times, 24 August 1956.
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well known, for example, that the word 'peace' in Soviet
usage means, as Lindley Fraser observes, 'the state of
affairs inside a communist country.' And yet it is a
major objective of Soviet policy to persuade noncommunists that, when communists use the word peace,
they give it the same meaning as do non-communists.
A somewhat similar situation prevails with respect to
Soviet usage of such terms as 'cultural relations' or
'cultural exchange.' While professing reciprocity, the
Kremlin practices, in so far as possible, a unilateral
dissemination of Soviet influence; only too often, in
the vital field of exchange of scientific and technical
knowledge with non-communist countries, Moscow seeks to
obtain patents, blue-prints, and processes and, in
return, to offer flattery, vague promises, and, it must
be admitted, an impressively cordial and often charming
hospitality.
The term 'exchange' itself thus takes its
place in the communist arsenal of double-talk.14
Even while the 1958 cultural agreement committed the
two nations to a single common cause, each spoke a different
language, setting conditions for miscommunication and
mishap.

Thus, in the name of peaceful coexistence, and

under auspices defined by equivocation, the Soviets seized
the moment to demonstrate Soviet devotion to peace, while
the U.S. government used truthspeak to promote East-West
intercourse.
An Uneven Match
The cultural competition, according to Barghoorn,
pitted a "monolithic, hierarchical Soviet state with
enforced homogeneity of ideas" against a "loosely organized,
almost chaotic pattern of American democracy."

Soviet

cultural diplomacy, which constituted an integral part of

14Barghoorn, 13 .
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Soviet totalitarian political ideology, dwarfed its American
equivalent.

Soviet citizens were expected to be mouthpieces

of official policy.

All Soviet literature, dance, music,

and art played a part in the political struggle, and the
Communist party developed a rich tradition of cultural
stagecraft dating at least to the 1925 creation of the state
cultural organ, VOKS.

As Barghoorn notes, "Central to

communist cultural diplomacy is the systematic utilization
of information, artistic, scientific, and other cultural
materials, symbols and personnel, and ideas, as instruments
of foreign policy."15
The Soviets circulated propaganda pamphlets in a
campaign to promote Soviet culture over Western bourgeois
culture.

The 1954 pamphlet, On Soviet Culture and the

Cultural Revolution in the USSR, for example, a widely
dispersed apocalyptic vision and cultural concomitant to
Khruschev's "We will bury you" boast, proclaimed the
following:

"Our country is the country of the most advanced

culture, the citadel of advanced scientific thought, of
revolutionary humanism and of a new, Communist morality."16
U.S. diplomats faced the Soviet effort which included
both an "effort to project to all men an image of the Soviet
way of life" and a "calculated effort to facilitate Soviet
foreign policy objectives."
15Ibid., 11, 12, 13, 272.
16Ibid., 19.
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to benevolence/ Soviet propaganda projected a dual thrust,
both a "complex amalgam of propaganda, deception and
sometimes mutually profitable transactions," and an "equally
massive effort to shield the Kremlin's subjects from harmful
'alien' influences."17

Up against such Soviet messionic

zeal, American public diplomacy could not be allowed to die
on the vine.

Of necessity, it was repackaged into a loose

cultural equivalent to State Department Director of Policy
Planning George Kennan's thesis of containment.

Just as

Kezrnan advised "to confront the Russians with unalterable
counter-force at every point where they show signs of
encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable
world, 1,18 so the U.S. informational offensive was
conscripted to meet Soviet propaganda wherever is surfaced-no small undertaking.
Like Tactics, Unlike Ends
As the exchanges proceeded, each side sought to
maximize gains in its primary objectives.

The Soviets aimed

to soften up the West in order to gain access to U.S.
science and technology, to earn dollars, and promote a
favorable image of themselves.

The United States aimed to

penetrate and revolutionize Soviet society by promoting a
freer flow of people, ideas and information, a goal
17Ibid., 12.
18,lThe Sources of Soviet Conduct," by "X", Foreign
Affairs, 1947, 581.
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initially envisioned by Secretary Dulles.

Although goals

were quite different, tactics of each bloc were similar, a
sampling of which includes the following:
Mechanisms to control exchanges under the agreement were
established early by both governments, the State
Committee for Cultural Relations in the USSR, and the
East-West Contacts Staff in the U.S. Department of
State.
The State Committee took a confrontational attitude on
most exchanges, reflecting not only the Cold War
attitude of the times but also the career affiliation of
many of its officers--the KGB. The Americans
reciprocated.
It was strictly tit-for-tat.
Each proposal for an exchange was presented to the other
government in the form of a diplomatic aide memoire.
This was very useful in avoiding misunderstandings-always possible in Soviet-American relations--but it
considerably slowed the process of getting on with
exchanges.
Security and intelligence were major considerations for
both sides. Travel and access for exchange visitors
were tightly controlled in each country.
Exchange
visitors were under surveillance in both countries.
Americans in the Soviet Union were often harassed and
occasionally entrapped by the KGB. A pattern of
harassment and expulsion did not end until the early
1970s.19
In truth, neither bloc was blameless in the tit-fortat, tug-of-war that passed for public diplomacy in the Cold
War.

1958 was just the beginning of what would be both a

cultural accord and a contest of civilizations.

"Since that

time," Parks notes, "the two nations have signed similar
pacts every two years, providing at least one relatively
stable element in an uneasy relationship that on occasion

19Richmond, 9-10.
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has become volatile."20

But, in the main, the pact was

more contretemps than rendezvous.

Each side was guarded and

confrontational, due to security and intelligence
considerations, and progress was gradual, painful, and
episodic, according to Irene Carstones, Cultural Affairs
Officer, USIA.21
East-West Tuq-of-War
As Yale Richmond explains, the benefits of
informational exchange to the U. S. were compromised by
relentless Soviet control.

In his book, U.S.-Soviet

Cultural Relations, which Irene Carstones has hailed as the
singular and superb treatment of the East-West Exchanges,
Richmond dedicates several chapters to sharing anecdotes of
Soviet tactics and problems in all forms of exchange.
Informational exchanges had more problems than anticipated.
The Soviets insisted on retaining full control over what was
reported in their own media, frustrating the primary U.S.
goal of infusing ideas into the Soviet Union:
Information exchanges--motion pictures, radio and
and television, and books and publications--are the
most ideological exchanges for the Soviet Union
because they threaten its monopoly on information.
These exchanges, therefore, proved to be the most
difficult for the United States to carry out under the
cultural agreement.22

20Parks, 173.
21Interview with Irene Carstones, USIA, March 1993.
22Richmond, 63.
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Problems with reciprocity, jamming of radio broadcasts,
censorship of the media, and travel restrictions, plagued
the informational and educational exchanges much more than
their performing arts complements.
meetings confirm this claim.

Records of diplomatic

Statements given at the time

of the U.S.-USSR Cultural Agreement in 1958 by W.S.B. Lacy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, cited
grievances that continually hindered the success of the
information exchange program.

Not only was the U.S.

government powerless over Soviet controls, it was also
unable to control the US private sector:
In the field of exchanges of information, we immediately
encounter basic obstacles. There is an all-embracing
Soviet censorship of press and radio. There is
systematic jamming of radio broadcasts from other
countries.... It is regrettable that, once in the Soviet
Union, the places a tourist may go are limited to
specified areas....The arrangements for distribution
[of Amerika] has been less than satisfactory. . ..
Where it is a question of the exchanges of technical
delegations, entertainment groups, and the like, you
already realize that on our side it must concern private
industry, individual impresarios, our private
institutions and organizations. The Department of State
cannot speak for them, and, believe it or not, cannot
induce them to do that which they do not wish to do. I
cannot emphasize this point too much.23
The U.S. government continued to operate according to
parameters set in the Latin American prototype--reciprocity,
private-public cooperation and a modest scale--even though

23"Opening Statements by United States and U.S.S.R.
Representatives on Technical, Scientific, and Cultural
Exchanges," Department of State Bulletin, 28 October
1957, 2.
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the U.S. endeavor was subsequently handicapped.

The modest

scale of U.S. public diplomacy, vis-a-vis its Soviet
complement, reduced the U.S. effort to an exercise in
futility, some members of Congress argued.

Frederick

Barghoorn reported:
A superficial comparison of the massive, streamlined,
centralized Soviet foreign cultural program with the
sometimes fumbling official American response to its
challenge, [suggests] that we are doomed to defeat in
the current contest of civilizations.24
But some government involvement was necessary for
monitoring persistent problems--reciprocity, equality and
mutuality of benefits in exchanges.

The U.S. private

sector, so long in control of U.S. cultural diplomacy, could
not have mastered the Cold War contest of civilizations
without the diplomatic and regulatory expertise of the U.S.
government.

Private and commercial enterprises, many of

whom had resented U.S. government involvement, were not
equipped to negotiate with the implacable Soviets.

Due to

an extreme disparity in public diplomacy budgets and the
systems used to enact it, the Soviets had the edge.

In

1959, for example, the estimated Soviet public diplomacy
budget was a whopping $1,167,000,00025 while the total
American budget weighed in at an anorexic $75,000,000.26

24Barghoorn, 8 -9 .
25Ibid. ,158.
26Interview with Theodore Streibert, "The New 'Voice of
A m e r i c a U . S . News & World Report, 26 March 1954, 64.
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Some twenty-five years later# the tale would remain the
same: $3.5 billion Soviet budget27 to $100.0 million
American investment.28
Academic exchange was underfinanced on the U.S. side,
both privately and publicly.

Professor and exchange

organizer Robert Byrnes noted that total private and public
U.S. appropriations to this vital enterprise were small by
Soviet standards:
During the period between 1958 and 1975 our government,
foundations, and universities together spent less than
$50,000,000 to support academic exchange programs with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, only a fraction of
the annual budget of a major state university in the
1970s or the cost of the Apollo-Soiuz joint manned space
laboratory in July 1975.29
The Soviets, eager to fulfill their foreign policy goal
of gaining access to Western science and technology,
invested heavily in exchanges, sending professionals on
student exchanges.

Hundreds of so-called students came from

the USSR to the U.S. inside and outside of the agreement,
violating reciprocity, a chief tenet of U.S. cultural
exchanges.

The academic exchanges were much more difficult

to monitor than the highly visible performing arts
exchanges, and the U.S. government was limited in its
ability to correct violations that were difficult to prove:

27Starr, x.
28Budget of the United States, 1985.
29Byrnes, 231.
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The principal American leverage for assuring reciprocity
is the visa authority, which assures complete control
over the flow of Soviet visitors. Beyond this power,
however, the U.S. has found that the limitation of
information about Soviet society makes it difficult to
pinpoint what we consider to be desirable exchanges.30
Visa control notwithstanding, it was next to impossible
to

prove clear violations, such asthe Soviet tactic of

repeatedly sending professional scientists on graduate
student exchanges.

The U.S. government finally threw its

hands up, and granted approval to exchanges not covered in
the official agreement.

According to Yale Richmond:

Cultural exchanges were released from the strictures of
the intergovernmental agreement with its quotas and
limits. The private sector was invited by State to
participate in what previously had been agovernmentdirected and regulated activity, and the result was a
broadening of U.S. contracts with the Soviet Union.31
Travel restrictions continually plagued people-topeople exchanges.

The Soviets designated portions of their

country as out of bounds to travellers and exchangees, and
the U.S. government responded by closing off portions of the
U.S.

Nonetheless, the U.S. government made repeated

overtures to the USSR to lift the geographical restrictions,
offering a menu that included strict reciprocity-Novosibirsk for Los Angeles, Omsk for Seattle, Tomsk for
Louisville, and so on.

The Soviets ignored the appeals.

Due to travel restrictions, visits to the USSR were
30,1
Soviet American Exchanges: For Different Reasons, Both
Sides Find Them Advantageous," Science, 10 November 1961,
1511.
31Richmond, 13 .
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unpleasant for official representatives and tourists alike.
The State Department addressed the problem, with limited
success.

The Nation reported:

The United States has recently taken a sensible step
toward increasing this intercourse [in U.S.-Soviet
relations] . At present, a third of the USSR is closed to
foreign eyes, and in America we have closed an
equivalent area to Russians. Almost a year ago, the
State Department suggested that both countries remove
these restrictions. The Russians have not replied and
now, with a patience too rare in American diplomacy, we
have submitted a second proposal, urging that at least
some equivalent areas be opened.32
Information exchange was less effective also due to the
disparity between the Soviet and American public diplomacy
systems.

The mixed private-public American system afforded

the Soviets a unique opportunity.

Cueing into the American

debate over control of cultural exchanges, the Soviets
stirred up dissension among American groups by playing one
sector off another.

Much like the Sol Hurok alliance, the

Soviets circumvented the official agreements and instead
negotiated directly with the private U.S. media.

Yale

Richmond notes:
Moscow, after a few years of attempting to place its
[radio/TV] programs through U.S. government channels,
began to deal directly with the U.S. networks and indivi
dual stations. By 1965 the placement of the programs
under the agreement was down to zero, and the exchange
of broadcasts was deleted from the agreement in 1968.33
It was easier for the Soviets to suspend fair play in

32,,The Diplomacy of Friendship," The Nation, 7 June 1958,
52.
33Richmond, 66.
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information exchanges than in the high profile performing
arts exchanges.

Moreover, the Soviets exercised tighter

control over informational than cultural exchanges.
Business Week reported, "The biggest roadblocks set up by
the Kremlin have been in the area of exchange of ideas-publications, films, broadcasts--rather than in an exchange
of people."34

Unhappily, therefore, informational exchange

encountered unforeseen difficulties.

For example, what was

designed to be an even exchange of Soviet and American
official publications met unexpected roadblocks because
Soviet and American publics had unequal interest in the
publications.

The Soviets blocked access to the American

magazine, Amerika, while Americans, given free access to the
Soviet magazine, USSR, showed little interest.

A 1962

Science magazine reported the troubles that beset the
exchange of Amerika and USSR, an endeavor that had been
intended to engender cordial relations:
One of the principal means for circulating information
about this country was to be the monthly magazine
Amerika, a slick picture publication, something in the
format of Life, which was to be permitted a distribution
of 50,000 in the Soviet Union in return for the same
circulation here of a similar Soviet publication, USSR.
Both are sold through newsstands and subscription, and
the observation of American officials has been that
Amerika is immensely sought after by the Soviet people.
In this country, however, slick magazine articles on the
Soviet Union are not a novelty. USSR has encountered
sales difficulties, and each month there has been a
remainder of several thousand unsold copies. In
34"Will the Swaps Keep On?" Business Week, 23 November
1963, 36.
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retaliation for the return of the unsold copies, the
Soviets have taken to sending back several thousand
copies of Amerika as unsalable.35
When information programs were not censored or blocked,
they were well-received by the Soviet people.

The Voice of

America, when heard, was appreciated, as this anecdote told
by Barghoorn relates:
We found that the English-language broadcasts of the VOA
and the BBC are immensely popular and we even learned
that the head of the English Department of the
University of Moscow had recently told a foreign
ambassador that Soviet students were learning the
American pronunciation of English by listening to the
VOA.36
Nonetheless, the penetration of U.S. broadcasts into
the USSR was uneven, whereas performing arts exchanges were
more tamper-proof.

Jamming, for example, rendered the VOA

only marginally effective: "Soviet jamming of the Voice of
America ended partially in 1959 and completely in 1963, was
resumed in 1968, ended again in 1973, and was resumed again
in 1980.37
Conclusion
Initially, information exchanges, including electronic
and print mediums, exhibitions and libraries, and some
academic exchanges, were the chief U.S. instruments of hope
for penetrating the USSR.

Many proved to be both

25Science, 10 November 1961, 1512.
36Barghoorn, 154.
37Richmond,

99.

94
disappointing and frustrating, however, by the following
measure: "Assessing the results of cultural exchange with
the Soviet Union is not easy," Yale Richmond advises, "but
what can be measured are changes made by Soviet Union to
accommodate exchanges with the West."

Three key problems--

reciprocity, travel restrictions, and free flow of
information--continually frustrated the U.S. initiative,
largely due to lack of Soviet accommodation.

Of the

seventeen points in the 1955 Geneva Conference agreement,
the defining accord for all subsequent East-West cultural
exchange agreements, four key conditions were not
implemented:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Freer exchange of information and ideas, including an
end to censorship;
Opening of information centers in each other's capitals;
End of jamming of radio broadcasts;
End of travel restrictions on diplomats.38
Because these four points were not implemented,

informational exchanges were not as successful as the
administration had hoped.

In time, performing arts exchange

upstaged information exchange, because the former was more
effective in staging a cultural offensive.

A 1964

Department of State Press Release promoted the idea that
Cultural Presentations should be made an increasingly
important arm of U.S. foreign policy.39

The definitive

38Ibid., 97.
39,,Cultural Presentations Program of Department of State
Seen Making Substantial Progress," Department of State Press
Release No. 531, 2 9 December 1964.
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1962 report on cultural exchange explained the shift in
emphasis from informational to cultural programs:
Very early in the program it became evident that the
original concept of using fairs and festivals as the
foci of the program was unrealistic and impractical.
With few exceptions, they did not provide ideal settings
for demonstrations of culture, and offerings were
considered not so much manifestations of American
cultural development as they were thought of as entries
in a cultural sweepstakes competition.
In a shift away from festivals, emphasis quickly moved
toward bringing some of our most notable performing arts
to audiences in the great capitals of the world.40
Performing arts exchanges offered hope for salvaging
goodwill among nations, and were heralded, with much ado, as
a possible saving grace of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The

Saturday Evening Post reported:
Why, then, all the fuss over the possibility that
Americans and Russians may, in a cautious and
restrained manner, make arrangements to exchange TV
shows, ballet dancers, scientific operations and works
of literature? It isn't so long ago that the works of
Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky were imported and read by
Americans. Why the need for so much protocol just to
restore a fraction of that relationship? The answer,
of course, is simply that the Communist dictatorship
has deliberately cut the Russian people off from
contacts with the outside world...41
Hope for reaching the Russian people came in the form of
performing arts exchanges, an unorthodox vehicle for U.S.
foreign policy.

40Larsen, 12.
41,,Why All the Uproar and Protocol, Just to Trade Cultures
with Khrushchev?" Saturday Evening Post, 1 March 1958, 10.
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"Will the Swaps Keep On?
Barghoorn Incident jeopardizes the Renewal of
Cultural Exchange Pact"
"The sound of laughter in New York is the
same as in Moscow," says Zinovy Gerdt, master of
ceremonies of the Obratsov Puppet theater. Gerdt
has been playing to packed houses at Manhattan's
Broadway Theater for the past month under the
banner of a broad cultural exchange program
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Last week, though, Americans stopped laughing.
The arrest of Yale Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn
on espionage charges in Moscow put a new chill
on American-Soviet relations.
The atmosphere
warmed slightly at midweek following Barghoorn's
release, which came after President Kennedy
threatened to cancel negotiations for renewal
of the five-year-old cultural exchange program.
The secretive life. The biggest roadblocks set
up by the Kremlin have been in the area of
exchange of ideas--publications, films, broadcasts
--rather than in an exchange of people.
This
reflects the tight thought control characteristic
of Soviet life.
Realistic v iew. The Administration has no
illusions that cultural exchanges will resolve
the cold war. Officials feel the program is too
limited in scope and the power of the Communist
oligarchy too great to effect any substantial
change in Soviet policy in the foreseeable future.
Two-Way Street. In the long run, though,
Washington hopes the program will stimulate in
Russia desires for political and intellectual
freedom and a higher standard of living--and
thus weaken the power of the state and its
ability to concentrate on the East-West struggle.

In the area of the arts, visits by such
performers as the New York City Ballet, the
Robert Shaw Chorale, the Benny Goodman band,
and the Boston Symphony have ripped away much
of what one scholar terms Russia's "xenophobic
curtain." American groups and individual
artists have been greeted with unalloyed
enthusiasm by Soviet audiences.
At the height of the U-2 incident, when soprano
Roberta Peters had to catch a late train to
Moscow after appearing in Leningrad, hundreds
of cheering concert-goers escorted her to the
station.
Selling the States. At the same time, tours
of America by groups like the Bolshoi Ballet,
the Moscow Circus, and the Leningrad Symphony
have given many Americans glimpses of real
live Russians and some understanding of
their ideas.
Artists and entertainers generally are less
politically oriented than other Soviet citizens
and seem to have wider latitude in expressing
opinions. .Many react enthusiastically to
America and don't hesitate to say so when they
return home. A few years ago, Igor Moiseyev,
head of the famous dance troupe, went so far
as to praise U.S. culture in a Moscow lecture.
One observer comments that the Russians are
tremendously impressed by American life and
shocked by the disparity between the official
Communist portrayal and what they see for
themselves. Unanimously, the young Russians
acclaim the cultural exchange program as a
way of reducing tensions and furthering peace.
Matter of value. Whatever the motive, the
speed with which the Communists freed Barghoorn
after Kennedy's protest indicates that they
value the program too much to jeopardize
its continuance--at least for the present.

THE COUP
Part I
Performing Arts Exchange,
Where Soviet and American Interest Dovetailed
As the 1963 Business Week article suggests, performing
arts exchanges became an arena in which Soviet and American
interests dovetailed, for a number of reasons: they were
less threatening than information exchange to the Soviets'
desire for control but they nonetheless permitted the United
States to penetrate the Soviet's "xenophobic curtain."
gave Americans "glimpses of real live Russians."

They

Soviet

artists and entertainers, less politically oriented than
academics and journalists, were given wider latitude to
express opinions that might otherwise have been censored,
some of which were uncharacteristically complimentary to our
"bourgeois and decadent society."

And many in each bloc saw

the exchanges as a means for reducing tensions.
Irene Carstones, Cultural Officer, USIA, who, for some
thirty years negotiated arts exchanges with the Soviets,
explained that performing arts exchanges just happened to
function as the meeting ground where "Soviet and American
interests dovetailed."

Performing arts exchanges addressed

U.S. interests, which were generally "subtle and
educational," Carstones notes, and Soviet interests, which
were "commercial and financial."1

Strategies dovetailed,

1Interview with Irene Carstones, March 1993.
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too, according to journalist Stephen S. Rosenfeld, who
conjectured that America's strategy of "taming of the
shrewd" was paired with the Soviets' strategy of "skewering
of the tame.'"2
"Countries conduct cultural exchange to show off their
achievements and to generate good will," Yale Richmond says.
"For the United States, however, cultural exchanges with the
Soviet Union have also been used to break down barriers to a
freer exchange of people, ideas, and information.1,3
American diplomats, ever pragmatists, did not overlook the
practical benefit of utilizing these gentle persuaders as
agents of change.

Conveniently, entry into the Soviet bloc

was made possible in part by the generous support of
Yekaterina A. Furtseva, Minister of Culture from 1960-1974,
a consistently strong advocate of Soviet cultural activities
abroad--with good reason.4

According to a 1964 Department

of State Bulletin, cultural exchanges allowed the Soviets to
advance two primary goals: obtaining scientific and
technical information (through educational exchanges); and
painting a favorable picture of the Soviet Union and its
policies

(via exchange of artistic groups, motion pictures,

magazines, or visitors).

Performing arts exchanges helped

2Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Soviet-American Exchanges--Titfor-Tat Goodwill," Science 143, 27 March 1964, 1413.
3Richmond, 20.
4Ibid., 28.
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the Soviets achieve a third goal, earning much-needed
American dollars.

U.S. officials understood the Soviets'

motivations, a 1962 Saturday Review article reported:
Our experienced U.S. government officials see clearly
that the Soviets know exactly what they want out of
exchanges: the latest scientific and technical infor
mation, and the chance to send scientists, technicians
and graduate students to the U.S. to get it; and the
opportunity to make a favorable impression on the
American people. These two initiatives are what
Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale calls 'the Soviet
cultural offensive.' Finally, the exchanges offer
another advantage: the opportunity to earn money!
For
example, our U.S. officials estimate the Soviet
government grossed the ruble equivalent of $500,000 out
of the Benny Goodman tour of the USSR.5
U.S. officials accepted these terms, the 1964 Department of
State Bulletin reported, because the exchanges provided "a
beacon of hope" for promoting a long-term American goal-accommodation of the normal flow of information and persons
between the two countries.6

In his 1961 report, Walter

Laves echoed the theme of hope:
Educational, scientific, and cultural contacts,
constitute at present the most hopeful means through
which we can make progress, however slow, toward
piercing the 11Iron Curtain" and toward the ultimate
participation by the Communist countries in world
affairs in a cooperating rather than in a disrupting
role.7

5Benton, Saturday Review, 27 October 1962, 20.
6"A Summary Report on the United States Exchanges Program
with the Soviet Union," Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges
Staff, Department of State Report, 18 April 1964, 3-4.
7Walter H.C. Laves, "Toward a National Effort in
International Educational and Cultural Affairs," at the
request of The U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational
Exchange, 3 April 1961, 16.
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In the main, the exchange program was something of a
coup for each bloc, an agreement in which each power
behefitted by cooperating through competition. "There is a
'cultural cold war' between the United States and the Soviet
Union," former Assistant Secretary of State William Benton
stated in 1962, "and I suggest that each side is winning."8
In the midst of the initial 1958 U.S.-Soviet Summit and
kickoff of the cultural exchange, the popular press
telegraphed a like message to the American people:

"The

stakes in international diplomacy were clearly higher than
in cultural exchanges.
there can be losers.

In diplomacy and military affairs
In the field of art everyone

gained.1,9
Because they accommodated the interests of each, the
performing arts exchanges were a foreign policy bonanza for
each power.

While Carstones cautions that performing arts

exchanges were considered to be of limited importance, they
did "open a door between the two countries, help
considerably to establish trust, and assist both countries
in learning how to work with one another."10

Limited in

scope and number, cultural exchanges nonetheless constituted
"the busiest of all streets between Washington and Moscow,"

8Ibid.,40.
9,,Americans there. Russians there: Biz Terrif," Life 44,
28 April 1958, 28.
10Ibid.
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and were significant to each bloc, reported Science magazine
in 1964:
The limited numbers and erratic dispersion of the
exchanges are misleading. They play a role more and not
less real for being largely symbolic, more and not less
telling for being small. This is evident to both
governments, which recently extended exchanges for two
more years.11
Perhaps, as a 1958 Life magazine article suggested, cultural
exchanges were the warm-up act, mere "people-to-people
preliminaries" that paved the way for the East-West
diplomatic initiative.12

But, what more could U.S. policy

makers require in a handmaiden of foreign policy?
Why Performing Arts?
There was method in the madness of using performing
artists who, through a "long-term, indirect process," acted
as agents of change for the purpose of influencing Soviet
society.13

Through cultural diplomacy, the U.S. gained

access to Soviet soil, with the potential of infusing ideas
into the USSR.

Artists, due to the universality of their

disciplines, provided a useful medium for promoting "Public
Understanding," a 1964 Department of State press release
reported:

11Rosenfeld, 1413.
12"Ambassadors Trying To Get Summit Show Also On The
Road," Life 44, 2 8 April 1958, 36.
13"A Summary Report of the United States Exchanges Program
with the Soviet Union," Department of State Report, 18 April
1964, 4-5.
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The [US-Soviet cultural exchange} program is primarily
intended to encourage international communication and
understanding, and the performer is uniquely equipped to
demonstrate American cultural achievements and to
surmount political, geographic, and language barriers,
because of the universality of the arts among peoples of
the- world.14
Because of the universality of their medium, cultural
exchanges captured the imaginations of Soviet and American
publics alike, and kept a channel of communication open
between warring blocs.

Indiana University Professor Byrnes,

a key organizer of U.S.-Soviet academic exchanges, describes
why performing arts (and sports) exchanges, which dominated
the public image of cultural exchanges, were public
diplomacy successes for each bloc:
For most Americans, and probably for most Soviet
citizens as well, basketball players and ballet dancers,
sprinters and soloists are the most important elements.
Thus, the Bolshoi Ballet had made four tours to the
United States by 197 0, as had the Moiseyev Folk Dance
Ensemble. The Kirov Ballet has completed two tours of
the United States. Such splendid groups not only serve
a Soviet political purpose, entertaining and impressing
thousands, but also earn dollars. For example, on its
first trip to this country, the Moiseyev Folk Dance
Ensemble grossed, $1,500,000 in an eleven-week tour. On
the other hand, American groups perform in many cities
in the Soviet Union, providing thousands of Soviet
citizens some understanding and insight into the
vitality and variety of our cultural life. Perhaps the
most successful have been Benny Goodman, who gave
thirty-one concerts in a tour in 1962, and Duke
Ellington and his orchestra, who visited five Soviet
cities in 1971 and attracted immense and enthusiastic
audiences.15
14 "Cultural Presentations Programs o f Department of State seen Making
Substantial Progress in Advisory Committee Report," Department o f State For The Press,
29 December 1964, No. 531, 2.
15Bymes, 50.
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Cultural exchanges, able to influence public opinion
through non-threatening means, offered a unique kind of
foreign policy strength.

A 1958 Department of State

publication named cultural exchange as a potentially
powerful foreign policy instrument with "strength available
greater than that of armies, ,|16 because of its unique power
to persuade without threatening.
ofState John

Eisenhower and Secretary

Foster Dulles echoed a similar sentiment.

Each believed that a defensive posture alone could

never win

the Cold War and that cultural diplomacy could offer a
uniquely non-military source of foreign policy strength.
Dulles stated:
Security cannot be achieved by arms alone, no matter
how large their accumulation. So today it is vitally
important that we detect and pursue the ways in which
cultural and economic assistance will mean more to free
world strength, stability, and solidarity than will
purely military measures.17
Part II
The Risks and Benefits of
Performing Arts Exchange for Each Bloc
By signing the official cultural exchange agreement,
each bloc assumed risks in the name of foreign policy goals.
Moreover, the cultural agreement, beginning in 1958,
constituted a pact in which gambles, concessions, and risks

16Colligan, Francis J., "Twenty Year After: Two Decades
of Government-Sponsored Cultural Relations," Department of
State Bulletin, 21 July 1958, 20.
xlDepartment of State Bulletin, 22 April 1957, 635.
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were taken for mutual benefit.

Each bloc believed it was

the chief beneficiary of the exchanges, a mutual perception
that rendered the performing arts exchanges even more
attractive.

"'We think we are getting the best of the

deal,' one high-ranking American official told [Saturday
Review3 , and they [the Soviets] think they are.

This is the

best of all possible deals."18
Nonetheless, the U.S. government took a risk by giving
the Soviet communist system an officially sanctioned vehicle
for engaging in propaganda and deception.

Moreover,

performing arts exchanges granted the Soviets permission to
exercise and refine their considerable propaganda talents.
The USSR, through skillful manipulation of its artists,
showcased its achievements and projected its culture as
benign and magnificent.

Frederick Barghoorn explains:

Soviet artists and scientists have made an excellent
impression in foreign countries since the death of
Stalin.
They make even less effort to conduct overt
propaganda than do Soviet journalists or officials.
Soviet artists and scientists, like Soviet chess players
and athletes, do not have to engage in propaganda.
The
excellence of their performances is the best advertise
ment of Soviet culture.19
Soviet artists fostered the deception that the Bolsheviks
were proponents of peace and encouraged the notion that the
Soviet nation was as great as the art it produced.

While

Soviet artists were relatively propaganda-free agents, the
18Kalb, Marvin L., "The Fine Art of Exchangemanship,"
Saturday Review 44, 13 May 1961, 56.
19Barghoorn, 145.
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exchanges provided an arena for the Soviets to reap
political capital.

As Yale Richmond tells it:

Soviet artists project an image of a vital, talented and
creative people whose government supports the arts and
is dedicated to peace and friendship with all countries.
If you like the Bolshoi, this line of thought goes, you
might also like the Bolsheviks.20
Unlike the American system, all Soviet art represented
the state and upheld the party line.

Also unlike the U.S.,

there was no known internal Soviet debate over linking
propaganda--such as the Soviets' self-promotion as the doves
of peace--to performing arts programs.

Barghoorn believes

that the Soviets deliberately, and deceptively, engaged its
arts and artists to project a false image:
Soviet cultural diplomacy is often tinged by what non
communists, at least, can only describe as deception.
In large part, its task is to establish in the minds
of its targets associations between, for example,
classical Russian music and the Kremlin's alleged
desire for peace.21
Ever swift to seize a propaganda opportunity, reap benefit
from unlikely sources, and assert national prowess, Soviet
authorities turned cultural exchange on its head.
Khrushchev, for example, insisted that cultural exchanges
with the West were proof of the Soviet Union's prominence in
world affairs:
Khrushchev, in a speech to coal miners in 1956, revealed
one of the subjective, psychological motives for display
of Soviet culture abroad. He said: 'The country's
growing authority abroad is reflected in the flood of
20Richmond, 17 .
21Barghoorn, 154.
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foreign delegations coining here.'22
But there were cracks in the Soviet propaganda machine,
and some risks did not pay off well.

Soviet artists did not

always adhere to the party line, and defections, though
infrequent, were high profile news in the U.S. popular
press.

Igor Moiseyev, for example, Soviet leader of a folk

dance group which Life called "Russia's most inviting Iron
Curtain-raiser," upset the Soviet cultural applecart when he
sang the praises of U.S. arts.

Barghoorn writes:

According to American press reports in 1959, Igor
Moiseev, the leader of the troupe bearing his name,
reported so enthusiastically to a Soviet lecture
audience on his impressions of America that he was
instructed by the Minister of Culture, Nikolai
Mikhailov, to express himself on this subject with more
restraint in the future.23
Further, the U.S. Department of State, aware of the Soviets'
formidable talent and taste for propaganda, exercised damage
control and waxed intolerant over flagrant acts of
deception.

The Soviets' attempt to tie the peace message

with appearances of the Red Army Chorus, for example, was
cut short.

The Department refused the Red Army Chorus' tour

on several occasions because of its activities in Eastern
Europe.24
Additionally, the State Department refused a Soviet
demand for a "guarantee of security," a de facto guarantee
22Ibid., 19.
23Ibid., 316.
24Richmond, 4.
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against defections, increasing the Soviets' risk of
embarassment.

Subsequent defections of major Soviet ballet

stars in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, brought humiliation to
the Soviets--but did not end the exchanges.

Richmond

relates:
In the early years of exchanges, the defections of
dancers Rudolf Nureyev (1961 in Paris), Natlaya Makarova
(1970 in London) and Mikhail Baryshnikov (1974 in
Toronto) did not interrupt Soviet exchanges with the
West.
Soviet pride was hurt by the loss of these and
other Soviet artists, but their defections were
separated by intervals of several years which
somewhat cushioned the shock.25
Interestingly, although defections made immediate headlines
in the American popular press, it took the Russian popular
press two years to acknowledge Nureyev's defection.

In a

delayed reaction, the columns of Ivestia charged that
Nureyev was "unstable, hysterical and vain," that he had
"betrayed Soviet art and his country, " and that his prior
popularity could be "explained by his vicious role of a
turncoat."26

Parenthetically, the Soviet loss in

defections was the West's gain.

America benefitted

permanently from the exchanges because the U.S. gained five
of the world's best dancers, including those listed above,
and Valentine and Valentina Kozlov in the mid-1980s.
Thus, political benefit to the Soviets was checked
somewhat by the U.S. Department of State's counter-measures

25Ibid. , 22.
26Saturday Review, 27 April 1963, 56.
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and by embarrassment brought on by defections.

All-round

benefit to the U.S. from performing arts exchanges may be
greater than previously perceived.

The U.S. benefitted

because Soviet artists were less of a political force with
which to be reckoned than were academics and journalists,
all of whom promoted Soviet Marxist-Leninism.
artists posed political embarassments.

And no U.S.

Certainly, the U.S.

suffered no loss of national face from defections.

The

State Department screened its potential cultural diplomats,
however, and in only one known case did a participant in an
academic exchange champion the communist creed while
representing the U.S. abroad.27
America's Artistic Ambassadors
American artists, perceived by the Soviets as a weak
political force, were positioned to stage a covert cultural
offensive on behalf of foreign policy goals.

Knowingly or

otherwise, American artists helped to carry out goals
propounded by Secretary Dulles in the 1950s--placing the
U.S. on the offensive, weakening and eventually
disintegrating the USSR, and liberating the Soviet peoples
from within.28
"The performers themselves," a 1962 Department of State
report tells us, "have frequently been real ambassadors

27Sorensen, 212.
28Dulles, 70.
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without portfolio in an assignment unprecedented in formal
U.S. international relations."29

Van Cliburn, for example,

the young Texan who took top honors in Russia's Tchaikovsky
piano competition in 1958, and who "had done better than the
politicians," according to Soviet First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan, was given "a conquering hero's welcome at the White
House," Life magazine reported.30
Much as Soviet artists were used to advertise the glory
of the Soviet state, American artists and performers were
seen as effective forces for countering a negative image of
America abroad.

William Benton, Assistant Secretary of

State for Public Affairs in the 1950s, told The New York
Times that American artists could answer the image of
Americans as a "materialistic, money mad race without
interest in art and without appreciation of artists or
music."31

In his 1961 report, W.H.C. Laves agreed that

"cultural presentations help positively to counteract the
widespread stereotype of the United States as a cultural
desert, and are an essential part of the governmental effort
to increase abroad understanding about the United

29Larsen, Roy E. and Wolfe, Glenn G., Report of Survey:
Cultural Presentations Program, for the U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs,
17 December 1962, 1.
30,1
Americans there. Russians here: biz terrif.," Life 44:
28 April 1958, 28-29.
31"U.S. Role in the Arts is Found to Have Increased in
Decade Since WWII," The New York Times, 8 December 1958, 1.

Ill
States."32

Robert Schnitzner, head of the talent agency

hired by the Department of State to oversee hiring of
artists, spoke of artist exchanges as good propaganda: "It
is propaganda--in the best sense.

We are saying, 'Here are

some artists whose work we enjoy and we hope you'll enjoy
it, too.'"33
Artists, by virtue of their ability to lift the Iron
Curtain and expose Soviets to Western ways and ideas,
influenced, and perhaps liberated, Soviet thinking, a risk
which the Soviet authorities took in order to achieve their
own foreign policy goals. "In deciding to engage in a
program of exchanges with the United States," a 1964
Department of State Bulletin reports, "Soviet leaders
knowingly accepted the calculated risk of complicating their
tasks in the field of internal control."34
According to Carstones, the Soviets thought that they
could control Western influence and diminish the risk by
rigorous screening of acceptable American performing artists
and by slow and incremental exposure of their people to
Western culture.35

Ever on guard, the Soviet government

was careful in the choice of acceptable performing arts

32Laves, 48.
33The New York Times, 8 December 1958, 1C.
34"A Summary Report on the United States Exchanges Program
with the Soviet Union," Department of State, 18 April 1964, 2.
35Interview with Irene Carstones.
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groups, and protective of the conservative and orthodox
tastes of its people, who had been isolated from Western
cultural influences since the 1930s.

If it can be imagined,

Soviet authorities auditioned, and rejected, such
established talents as Martha Graham and Benny Goodman, as
forces so unorthodox as to threaten Soviet cultural control.
Slowly, over a period of years, controls were relaxed.
Gradualism was the watchword in cultural exchange, with the
popular press acting as a thermometer to gauge and report
degrees of cultural thaw.

Groups that had been rejected as

subversive, such as Benny Goodman's band, were eventually
allowed behind the Iron Curtain, at the State Department's
insistence.36

In a 1962 Newsweek, "For Kremlin Cats" well

summarizes the gradual Soviet shift in relaxing controls,
and reluctantly accommodating the U.S. cultural offensive:
'Nyet, nyet, nyet,' has for years been the inevitable
Soviet response to the idea of admitting any U.S. jazz
group to the USSR. Too decadent, said the Russians.
Yet last week, Russia finally said 'da.' Benny Goodman,
that epitome of capitalistic decadence, could visit the
Soviet Union this year, complete with orchestra and
clarinet...
The big breakthrough on B.G.'s swing ensemble came when
the State Department insisted that the only exchange for
the money-making Bolshoi Theatre Ballet was Goodman.37
The Soviets were forced to accept American conditions,
or forsake the lucrative rewards--the purse and prestige--of
performing arts exchanges.

As the Soviets relaxed controls,
i

36Ibid.
37"For Kremlin Cats," Newsweek, 19 March 1962, 34.
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and compromized to attain foreign policy goals, some of
their fears were realized.

American diplomats gained the

leverage needed to develop a cultural offensive and
penetrate Soviet culture.
Part III
The Curtain Rises
Gradual trust and relaxation of controls on each side
meant that art once considered decadent and bourgeois--that
likely to upset strict social controls in the Soviet Union-was able to venture behind the Iron Curtain.
the artists took over.

From then on,

Up went the Iron Curtain.

The

Soviets were exposed to the buoyant freedom of American
arts.

As reported in the popular press, American exhibits

such as "The Family of Man," a 1959 photographic exhibit
hosted by poet-biographer Carl Sandburg and photographer
Edward Steichen, helped set a tone of goodwill between
Soviets and Americans.

The exhibit was designed to

establish a bond of common humanity, according to Sandburg,
who claimed that "the people of Russia will be able to feel
their kinship to the whole family of man over the earth."38
From 1958-1964, according to State Department reports,
arts exchanges sustained the East-West cultural cordiality.
Highlights of the period include the following exchanges: a

38White, Jean, "Sandburg, Steichen to Explain Man's
Universality to Russians," The Washington Post and Times
Herald, 15 February 1959, IA.
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195839; a four-city U.S. tour of five Russian composers in
1959, including Shostakovich, preceded by a delegation of
four U.S. composers to the USSR in the summer of 1958;40 an
American Ballet Theatre two-month tour to Moscow, Leningrad,
Kiev, Warsaw and Prague, the first by an American dance
company;41 a month's exchange of four prominent American and
Soviet writers;42 a yearly exchange of performing artists to
include two groups each, the first year of which featured
the Soviet Pyatnitsky Choir and the New York Philharmonic
Orchestra;43 a cinematography exchange of seven American
films purchased by the USSR, and four Soviet films purchased
by the U.S.;44 four American fine artists to the Soviet
Union in 1959, followed by reciprocal visit of Soviet

39.1Agreement Between the United States and All-Union
Chamber of Commerce of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics," Department of State Press Release No. 779, 29
December 1958, 1.
40.1Soviet Composers to be Honored at Concerts in four U.S.
Cities," American Council on Education Press Release, 18
October 1959, 1.
41"U.S. Ballet Theatre to Dance in Russia," The New York
Times, 5 October 57, IB.
42"Four American Writers to Visit Soviet Union under State
Department Exchange Program, " Department of State Press
Release No. 554, 31 July 1959, 1.
43"Agreement Between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics for Exchange of Performing
Artists," Department of State Press Release No. 267, 16 April
1959, 1.
44"U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cinematography," Department
of State Press Release No. 599, 9 October 1958, 2.
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artists to the U.S.;45 several exchanges of the Bolshoi and
New York City Ballet; and, a 1961 two-month tour of the USSR
by the University of Michigan Symphonic Band.46
A 1961 Saturday Review featured an insightful report on
the role of American arts in the cultural offensive, as part
of the positive foreign policy prescribed by NSC 5607:
Ninety-four crew-cut and pony-tailed students from the
University of Michigan invaded the Soviet Union, a
fiercely nationalistic country. They had been
dispatched by the State Department, a 'black arm' of the
United States Government that is always accused here of
hatching 'plots against peace' and 'aggression against
Russia.'
Yet the students were welcomed.
Indeed, they
were cheered, praised, admired and applauded.
Washington would like to destroy the distorted image of
the United States that Soviet propagandists have
cultivated for more than four decades.
It would like to
balance the sneering caricature of a fat Wall Street
millionaire with the cheerful reality of ninety-four
undergraduates from Ann Arbor. And, ideally, it would
like to offer the Russian people a clearer idea of the
"outside world" than they have found in the columns of
Pravda.47
As the cultural offensive ensued, Soviet authorities'
attempts to protect cultural absolutism were undone by
popular opinion within the USSR.

Slowly, U.S. cultural

diplomacy whittled away the Soviet cultural monolith by
infusing ideas and information into the USSR, acting on
45"Four American Artists to visit Soviet Union under
Exchange Program," Department of State Press Release No. 579,
2 October 1958,1.
46"University of Michigan Symphonic Band Begins Tour of
the U.S.S.R. under Cultural Presentations Program,"
Department of State Press Release No. 75, 17 February 1961, 1.
47Kalb, Marvin L., "The Fine Art of Exchangeship,"
Saturday Review, 13 May 1961, 56.
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Dulles' vision to liberate the Soviet peoples from within by
processes short of war.48

A 1962 Time article, "The Spirit

in Moscow," telegraphed the good news of cultural exchange
and the triumphs of public diplomacy:
Moscow was reeling under the heaviest American cultural
onslaught in its history. Within the space of only a
few weeks, Bass Jerome Hines had launched a Russian tour
from the stage of the Bolshoi, Igor Stravinsky had
returned to his homeland, and George Balanchine had
arrived with his New York City Ballet. Then, almost
unheralded, the Robert Shaw Chorale turned up last week
and outdid them all.
What made the chorale's success doubly surprising was
the fact that Conductor Shaw made no compromise with his
audience. He not only included Friede auf Erden by
Composer Arnold Schoenberg, who is ideologically
unacceptable in Russian musical circles, but he also
scheduled a great deal of religious music, which is
virtually never heard in Russian concert halls.
Shaw was surprised by the Russians' fervent response.
Soviet Deputy Cultural Minister Alexander Kuznetsov
offered a hopeful explanation.
'We Russians,' said he,
'also understand things of the spirit.'49
Effects of the Cultural Offensive
But did the performing artists reach a public beyond
the elite Soviet apparatchik?

Yes, insists Bill McGuire,

USIA cultural officer for U.S.-Soviet Exchange, through word
of mouth and through Soviet state-run papers.50

Through

the popular press, publics of each bloc were made aware of
the triumphs of public diplomacy, especially the performing

48Dulles' Statement on Liberation, 1953, 5.
49"The Spirit in Moscow," Time, 26 October 1962, 63.
50Interview with Bill McGuire, USIA, March 1992.
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arts exchanges.

Pravda, for instance, the most important

Soviet state-run newspaper, reported, perhaps reluctantly
so, the overwhelming success of the New York City Ballet
during its 1963 USSR tour.
Efforts by the Soviet press to mitigate the favorable
impression of American artists did not necessarily reduce
the effects of the American cultural offensive.

Often,

Soviet press reviews were slanted, but the Soviet people
were not fooled.

In 1964, an unclassified Department of

State list of 3,000 comments made by Soviet visitors to the
Moscow exhibit,

"Graphic Arts: USA," for example, included

the following telling testimony by a young Muscovite:
I congratulate you for the excellent exposition. I never
had such deep joy.
I always believed America has many
clever and strong artists. No doubt this exhibit will
be the main exhibition of the year. In spite of the
reaction of our stupid press, I like your art.51
Other comments from the document run the range of
sentiments, and provide a rare insight into the effects of
the American cultural offensive.

The most salient, and

touching, comments, some in English and some translated,
include the following:
The interest taken in the exhibit should understand as
our will for Peace. We can not agree with your abstract
things, they are senseless! Magazines and advertisement
are much better, but all that can be the subject of
arguement.
But one thing can not, it is the bomb. Let
art arguments be the only ones between our people!

51"Comments by Visitors to the Moscow Showing of 'Graphic
Arts: USA,'" U.S. Information Agency Unclassified Document
A-1026, American Embassy, Moscow, 25 January 1964, 3.
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The exhibit is a good one, but in a few years we will be
able to show as good a one of our national art.
I would like to express my deepest sympathy to the
American people for the grief they have suffered in
connection with the tragic death of the great president
Kennedy.
I was not able to do this elsewhere, so I am
writing it here.
A marvelous exhibit...Long live the friendship between
the Soviet and American people.
Exchanging exhibits is better then exchanging
threatening notes.
Friendship!
Friends!
It would have been better to name the exhibit "The
Disgrace of the 20th Century" with certain exceptions.
It was a wonderful exhibition. But for God's sake,
abolish racial discrimination in America.
It was pleasant to see our flags together.
It was
pleasant to talk with you in a single language, the
language of art. Pass our best wishes and regards to
the American people! We want to live in peace.
Thanks
to your guides; they are few and our questions are so
numerous.
Finally, a Russian engineer wrote the following comment,
revealing a commonly held opinion on the shenanigans of the
Soviet press:
I like the exhibit very much. There are many
creations, fantastic as well as genuine artistic
works by American artists. The review in Literary
Gazette (10 January 1964) left everyone with a
feeling of dissatisfaction and sorrow that it was
written with a bias. Each item of praise is
accompanied by critical comments.
The critic
obviously was forced to struggle against praising the
good things.52

52Ibid, 1-10.

119
Part IV
Cultural Coup d'Etat bv the Corps de Ballet
Dance Exchanges: The State Department's Trump Card
Dance exchanges proved to be a trump card for the State
Department, mostly because Soviet ballet has always been
inextricably tied to glory of the state.

Moreover, high-

profile defections of great Soviet dancers to the West
telegraphed a loud message that the freedom inherent in
American dance was more precious to the expatriates than the
restricted grandeur of Soviet dance.
George Balanchine, great ballet master of the New York
City Ballet, and a native Soviet who had expatriated to the
U.S. in 1933, was "met and lionized by the press" during the
1962 New York City Ballet tour of the USSR.

Balanchine was

greeted with a banner that trumpeted Soviet grandeur-"Welcome to Moscow, home of classical ballet."

Soviet

audiences were slow to warm to American ballet, but did so
nonetheless.

One American participant filed the following

account in the highly respected publication, Dance Magazine:
At our opening night in Moscow, the response of the
audience (which, except for the balcony, consisted
mainly of diplomats) was cool and puzzling.
The pas de
deux in Agon provided the first real excitement of this
audience.
Western Symphony pleased and, at last, evoked
vociferous approval. There was much animated comment
around me throughout, which I could not understand, but
evidently there was great interest in the balcony.
Subsequent performances have already begun the process
of wearing down reticence.53

53Moncion, Francisco, "The Friday Report: Letters from NYC
Ballet Abroad," Dance Magazine, December 1962, 22.
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Playing an important role in the US cultural offensive
because of his unique tie to each bloc, Balanchine, as
reported in the popular press, dealt a blow to Soviet dance,
and by association, to Soviet greatness in general.

He

insisted that the USSR was home to romantic ballet, a dated
state art trapped in the aesthetics of a backward culture,
and that the U.S. was now the home of classical ballet.

New

York City Ballet's performances then demonstrated his claim
by winning wide acclaim in the USSR.

Time magazine crowed

about the cultural coup d'etat by the corps de ballet:
'I tell you,' said New York City Ballet's George
Balanchine,'it's fantastic. Between us--our company
and Stravinsky--we may bring about a change here that
will influence the entire future of ballet and music.'
Few who sensed the shock waves of excitement in Russian
intellectual circles last week doubted that Balanchine
knew what he was talking about.
It remained for
Russia's two great expatriates--one of whom had not set
foot in his homeland for half a century, the other for
better than 35 years--to trouble and challenge some of
the basic intellectual assumptions of Russian art.
Applause from dissenters. For the ballet's opening-night
program at the Bolshoi Theater, all seats were sold out
weeks in advance, with the first several solid rows
reserved for top officials of the Ministry of Culture.
The upper galleries, jammed with younger members of the
audience, erupted in noise at the curtain.
Pravda, not certain how far it should go in endorsing
bourgeois decadence, cautiously found the opening night
a "big success." But the response of the crowds on the
second night, when Balanchine's dancers repeated the
program in the new Kremlin Palace of Congresses,
indicated that it was more than that. Young Russian
dancers, ballet students and just plain fans crowded to
the stage at evening's end and clapped until the lights
were turned off.54

54"Shock Waves in Moscow," Time, 19 October 1962, 57.
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Thus, even American ballet, an unlikely protagonist of
American foreign policy, broke through the cultural Iron
Curtain, and worked its magic on the Soviet people.
Simultaneously, as evidence that Soviet and American
interests dovetailed, the Bolshoi Ballet took the U.S. by
storm, creating a sensation in the popular press.
Dance Magazine reported:
While the New York City Ballet has been creating a
sensation in the USSR, the Bolshoi, too, has been
playing to capacity-plus houses. A climax of the
Russian tour came when President and Mrs. Kennedy
and a glittering array of the capital's officialdom
attended the opening night performance of Swan Lake.
A delightful prelude took place during the afternoon
when Mrs. Kennedy and her daughter Caroline paid a
surprise visit to the Washington School of Ballet to
watch the Russian dancers rehearse.
On the following
day the entire Bolshoi paid a call to the White House,
where they were again greeted by the Kennedys.55
During this rare period of cultural enlightenment in
the midst of the Cold War, dance exchanges did best what
public diplomacy is supposed to do, favorably influence the
publics, foster goodwill, and promote national interests.
And, as proof that public diplomacy affects both domestic
and foreign publics, the 1962 Survey for the U.S. Commission
on Cultural Presentations reported that response to
performances abroad of the New York City Ballet, the
American Ballet Theatre, and Jerome Robbins Dance was so
enthusiastic that the effect of the overseas tours had an

55,1
1962, 19.

The Kennedys and the Bolshoi, " Dance Magazine, December
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important effect on the reception that ballet has since had
in the U.S.56

Parenthetically, ballet in Russia and

Ukraine today is certainly no longer a strict classical
Russian ballet, but rather a hybrid expression that has
absorbed Western influence, as evident in recent tours of
the Bolshoi and Kirov Ballets.
But what real difference could this make in achieving
US foreign policy goals?

Because achievement in the arts

was so tied to the Soviet's sense of prestige, the
triumphant appearances of U.S. performing arts in the Soviet
Union were seen as undermining the uniqueness of the Soviet
claim.

It can also be argued that since Soviet ballet was

so tied to glory of the state, the success of American
ballet, a product of a free, progressive culture, infused
American ideas into Soviet culture.

And, by virtue of its

joyous reception and acceptance there, American dance had
some effect, however small, in telegraphing America's
accomplishments to the world, of creating goodwill, and of
advancing the American goal of promoting evolutionary change
within the USSR.
Part V
The Applause
Americans have been reluctant to credit cultural
diplomacy for benefits confered during U.S.-Soviet Cold War
relations.

Interestingly, the Soviets have been more eager

56Larsen and Wolfe, 7.
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to praise cultural exchange, perhaps because they have a
greater investment in and proclivity toward public
diplomacy.

In the 1962 article, "Should We Continue The

Cultural Exchanges with the USSR?," Assistant Secretary of
State William Benton declared, "I agree that any exchange of
artists and performers is good in itself.

But it is a

delusion to think such exchanges can play any significant
role in bridging the deep differences between the two
countries."

In the same article, Sergei Romansky, chairman

of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries, was much more charitable in his assessment,
imparting these words of wisdom:
We have now had five years of experience [with cultural
exchange] . We have learned that both sides get
advantages. We've learned that through these cultural
exchanges our people get to know each other better.
These are not mere words--these are facts. It is
impossible for our Soviet groups to visit the United
States and to leave no trace of impact on your people.
It is equally impossible for your exhibits to come here
and leave no impact on our people. We cannot exchange
professors and experts without creating some influence
upon our respective peoples.57
The influence, to be sure, is beyond precise measure.

But,

as Mr. Romansky has stated, cultural exchanges were so
favorably received that they had to have effected some
degree of cultural alteration, often believed to be a
prelude to political change.

The publics-at-large in each

bloc, recipients of wildly enthusiastic reports on the EastWest cultural exchange, had to have been influenced.
57Benton, 17.

124
Thus, performing arts exchange, in spite of cameo
appearances, produced positive results beyond what modest
Congressional appropriations allowed--goodwill on a
shoestring.

Moreover, in doing so, they fulfilled the ends

of NSC directive 5067, by contributing to "positive" foreign
policy of cultural rapprochement, as opposed to "negative"
policy of force.

And they provided an "offensive" means to

penetrate the Soviet Union, thereby complementing the purely
i

defensive policy of containment that many, like President
Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, believed was an inadequate
strategy for battling the Cold War.

Performing arts

exchanges did their bit to advance U.S. foreign policy goals
and NSC directives, and constituted a public diplomacy
success.

Yale Richmond argues:

American are aware of the impact made in the United
States by the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moiseyev Dance
Ensemble, the Soviet symphony orchestras and virtuoso
soloists. But most Americans cannot begin to appreciate
the impact made in the Soviet Union by the New York City
Ballet, American Ballet Theater, Alvin Ailey Dance
Theater, Paul Taylor Dance Company, Benny Goodman, Duke
Ellington, Preservation Hall Jazz Band, Arena Stage,
American Conservatory Theater and Jessica Tandy and Hume
Cronyn in the Pulitzer Prize-winning play, "The Gin
Game," to name a few.
To Soviet audiences, isolated from Western cultural
influences since the 1930s, the visits by American
artists brought a breath of fresh air as well as new
artistic concepts in music, dance and theater to a
country where orthodoxy and conservatism have long ruled
in the performing arts.58

58Richmond, 17.
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Part VI
Conclusion
The Final Review: The Press, the Publics,
and Public Diplomacy
If the effectiveness of U.S.-Soviet performing arts
exchanges can be measured, it is through Department of State
reports, and through reports to the public in the popular
press.

As the press reports from Time, Newsweek,

Saturday

Review,, U.S. News & World Report, Science, and Business
Week indicate, the performing arts exchanges did what public
diplomacy is designed to do--favorably influence public
opinion in both the USSR and U.S. by creating, oddly enough,
camaraderie through competition.

While American access to

the USSR was limited during the Cold War, State Department
reports, as cited, provide a working sketch of the scope and
effect of Soviet popular reports on cultural exchange.

In

total, millions of Soviets were reached, either directly or
through print and electronic mediums.

As word reached the

public, cultural diplomacy fulfilled the six US foreign
policy objectives, and acted as a tool to fight communism.
As USIA Chief Streibert conceded in the 1954 U.S. News
& World Report interview, there is no way to measure
effectiveness of public diplomacy, "except," Streibert
states, "as you get more of the free people of the world
with you and feel that they are on our side.

It's a
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subjective judgment, almost like advertising.1,59
Estimates of the effects on the Soviet public are
complicated because access to information was so limited
during the Cold War.

Nonetheless, objective statistics and

reports about the USSR are available from the State
Department and popular press.

Sheer numbers suggest that

U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange over a five-year period, 19581963, was robust enough to effect a cultural thaw even as
continual crises--the 1959 U-2 incident, the Berlin Crisis,
the Vienna Conference and Bay of Pigs, all 1961 and the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis--characterized the diplomatic climate:
"By the end of 1963, according to records of the Department
of State, 5,495 Americans had traveled to the USSR as the
result of 520 exchanges projects, and 4,646 Soviet citizens
had come to the United States under 550 exchanges
projects.1,60
From what U.S. officials could gather, U.S. performing
artists reached a public beyond the Soviet elite,
penetrating into portions of society that had access to
radio or television.

The Department of State noted:

During its 7 -week visit to the Soviet Union, the
University of Michigan Symphonic Band played some 40
concerts to audiences totaling more than 70,000 besides
those reached by radio and television.61
59Streibert Interview, 64.
60Department of State Summary Report, April 1964, 1.
61Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1961, The Department
of State, 24.
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Effects of exchanges went beyond participants, due
especially to the ripple effect of performing arts
exchanges.

Unlike educational exchanges, which often

benefit only individual participants, performing arts
exchange benefitted the public-at-large in both nations,
doing, it may be argued, just what public diplomacy should
do.

A 1960 Department of State publication. Education and

Cultural Diplomacy, provides a sketch of press coverage
within the Soviet Union, a necessity for the success of
/

public diplomacy:
'My Fair Lady' played to Russian audiences during April,
May, and June, 1960, when a total of 56 performances of
the musical comedy was given in Moscow, Leningrad, and
Kiev.
It was also televised on the State TV system.
Newspaper reviews of the show were highly favorable, and
Moscow officialdom was very cordial to the large cast of
performers.62
Word got out.

According to the 1963 Congressional

Record, close to a million Soviet citizens attended the USIA
exhibits in the USSR.

"Graphic Arts: U.S.A.," a USIA

exhibit that toured the USSR, enjoyed unexpected success,
the Congressional Record reports, in locations as remote as
Alma Ata, Kazakhstan: "During the first week alone [in
Kazakhstan], over 100,000 Soviets attended the exhibit.

The

size of the crowds came as a surprise to Jack Masey of the
exhibits division of the U.S. Information Agency.

He

expected a sizable turnout but not the more than 1,000 every

62Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, U.S. Department of
State, 1960, 53.
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hour who have been pouring in since the show opened.63
Indeed, several written comments from visitors
to the exhibit included complaints that there were not
enough US guides to accommodate all the questions.

There

could be many reasons for this oversight, including
inability to predict turnout, lack of funds to hire guides,
or lack of willingness within the State Department to
adequately fund cultural rather than informational exchange.
Many in the State Department sided with the traditional view
offered by William Benton:
When the Bolshoi Ballet and Moiseyev Dance Group come to
the U.S. while Benny Goodman and the Philadelphia
Orchestra are visiting Russia, I believe both Soviets
and ourselves benefit greatly. But I am even more
interested in exchanges of information that can lead to
greater political understanding--including understanding
of differences and conflicts.64
A majority within the Department of State, consistent with
Assistant Secretary William Benton's view, continued to
support informational over cultural exchange, even though
the latter consistently gave a bigger bang for each official
buck.
Performing arts exchanges were not without the standard
fare of problems endemic to all U.S.-Soviet Cold War
exchange--visa problems, difficult negotiations, and
occasional no-shows.

As with other forms of U.S.-Soviet

63Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the
88th Congress, First Session, Senate, Monday, November 4, 1963.
64Benton, 17.
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exchange, reciprocity was a problem, with such discrepancies
as Soviet artists having all-expense-paid visits and
opportunities in the US, terms that were not reciprocated
for US artists in the USSR.65
But when the show did go on, the results were almost
uniformly positive, on both sides of the globe.

Even in the

midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when many, including
William Benton, asked if the cultural exchanges should be
continued, Jerome Hines, an artistic ambassador, responded,
through the popular press, with a strong affirmative:
The October 27 issue of Saturday Review was one of the
first of my own country's publications I read after
landing at Idlewild Airport after four and a half weeks
of operatic appearances in Russia. A day previous,
following President Kennedy's historic speech announcing
the Cuban blockade, I sang my final performance as
'Boris Godunov' at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow.
Despite the tensions that must have been besetting him,
Premier Khrushchev attended, came backstage later with
congratulations, and kept his private worries to
himself. Was this, I wondered, a public vote for our
cultural exchange program?
Therefore, the article 'Should We Continues the Cultural
Exchanges with the USSR?' by former assistant Secretary
of State William Benton, struck strongly home to me
personally. Some who gathered at the airport as I landed
safely seemed to think I was one of the 'last men out,'
barely escaping, as it were, from 'the cultural
exchange.'
This, of course, was not in question. The
warm audience response at the final 'Boris' proved that
the love of art and music that both nations have in
common stands firm against the most pressing global
situation.
After the problem of Cuba has been settled, I believe
that all of Mr. Benton's provocative views should be
considered at the highest levels. Certainly he is not
65Richmond, 125.
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in error in giving what I interpret as a qualified
approval to the exchange of artists between the two
countries. Certainly he is correct in writing that
'Other types of exchange...offer the greatest promise of
creating a climate that improves the change of peace.'
And his statement that the Iron Curtain is an 'Iron
Curtain of misunderstanding" is incontrovertible.
I know from my own recent experiences that a free
exchange of our ideas, our science, and our art with the
Russian people can help us find eventual lasting peace.
Beyond these crucial, immediate days, the peoples of
both our lands promise hope rather than despair.
Jerome Hines,
Metropolitan Opera
At the very least, the performing arts programs proved
to be a pleasant cultural oasis for both nations in the
midst of the Cold War's contest of civilizations.
can be said that more was achieved.

But it

Although each nation

succeeded in achieving its policy goals, the US especially
benefitted in achieving the goal of infusing ideas and
information into the USSR, a goal that could never have been
won by containment alone.

Neither won, Richmond tells us,

but neither lost, the cultural competition.

Though

something of a draw, the successful U.S. performing arts
programs, meant that a modest American handmaiden matched a
Soviet totalitarian dragon with minimal effort and optimal
effect.

APPENDIX A
NSC 5607, "East-West Exchanges"
NSC 5607
June 29, 1956
NOTE B Y cTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EAST-WEST EXCHANGES
References:

A.
B.
C.
D.

NSC 5508/1
NSC 5602/1
NSC Action Nos. 1522-g and 1577
Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated June 6 and 19, 1956

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce,
the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, and
the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 2 89th Council
meeting on June 28, 1956, discussed the draft statement of
policy on the subject, submitted as the Department of State
position and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June
6; the recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board,
transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19; and the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported by the
Chairman, JSC, at the meeting. The Council adopted the
statement of policy, subject to the amendments set forth in
NSC Action No.1577-b.
The President has this date approved the abovementioned statement of policy, as amended and adopted by the
Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5607, and (1) refers it
to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation
with the Department of Justice and other departments,
agencies and boards as appropriate; keeping the Departments
of Defense and Commerce and, as appropriate, other
interested departments, agencies and boards informed in
advance of proposed East-West exchanges; and (2) directs the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to
cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal
security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet
and satellite nationals to the United States.
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NSC 5 607, as approved, supersedes NSC 5508/1.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc:

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

Secretary of the Treasury
Attorney General
Secretary of Commerce
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, IIC
Chairman, ICIS
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APPENDIX A
STATEMENT OF POLICY
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EAST-WEST EXCHANGES
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.
The basic strategy of the United States vis-a-vis
the Soviet bloc is:
a. To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward
a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will
seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather
than the global ambitions of International Communism, and
which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the
governed rather than upon despotic police power.
b. As regards the European satellites, we seek
their
evolution toward independence of Moscow.
2.
For the first time since the end of World War II
there are visible signs of progress along the lines we
desire.
3.
Within the Soviet Union there is increasing
education and consequent demand for greater freedom of
thought and expression; there is increasing demand for
greater personal security than existed under Stalin's police
state, and there is increasing demand for more consumer's
[sic] goods and better living conditions for the masses of
people.
The demands referred to must be considerable
because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic
and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.
4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a
considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the
Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere,
with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff
of the world proletariat. The fact that "Titoism" is now
regarded as respectable by the Soviet rules, and that it is
profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite
countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, to
seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of
Moscow.
5. There has thus come about a condition which should
lead the United States intensively to seek projects which
would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the
liberal tendencies referred to.
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6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three
Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal
which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the
Soviet Union, which, however, indicated that it might be
prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated
lines on the basis of bilateral talks.
7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be
considered in the foregoing context.
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
8. Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so
far the use of force is concerned. But they can be
offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater
individual freedom, well-being and security within the
Soviet Union, and greater independence within the
satellites.
In other words, East-West exchanges should be
an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.
9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by
the United States itself, and we should not be content with
the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon
soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups
within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives
should be accepted, and the private U.S. initiatives should
be welcomed, whenever they advance U.S. policy or seem to be
an acceptable and necessary price for what will advance U.S.
policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning
imaginatively in this field.
10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular
consideration is the impact of what we do upon third
countries as well as upon military, political and economic
cooperation among the countries of the free world.
In many
cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange
which to other countries would be poisonous.
Consideration
should be given to explaining to third countries, on a
confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and
the precautions we would take, so that they will not
misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that
Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done,
for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting
of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing
frequency in recent months. There could be similar
expositions made on a selective basis with friendly
countries of Africa and Asia.
In this way, it could be made
clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to
weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an
acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet
motives have so changed that they are no longer to be
feared.
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OBJECTIVES
11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet and
satellite people as to the outer world so that their
judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist
fiction.
12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the
Soviet and satellite peoples challenging ideas and
demonstrating to Soviet and satellite intellectuals the
scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the
United States.
13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet and satellite
citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to
them the degree of personal security which is afforded by
our constitutional and legal systems.
14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods
by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free
labor and how much they themselves could gain from a
government which primarily sought their well-being and not
conquest.
15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite
countries by reviving the historic traditions of these
peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be
derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such
as Tito exhibited.
COURSES OF ACTION
16. The United States should take the initiative in
East-West exchanges as positive instrument of U.S. foreign
policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal
(attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers
meeting.
Each proposal should be judged on its merits as
contributing to the agreed objectives.
17. The United States should make clear as appropriate
to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.
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APPENDIX B
Seventeen-Point Proposal Submitted
at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting
October 1955
1. Freer exchange of information and ideas should be
facilitated. All Censorship should be progressivelyeliminated.
The obstacles which hamper the flow of full
factual information and varied comment between the peoples
of the West and those of the Soviet Union, should be
removed.
2. Arrangements should be made for the four Powers to
open information centers, on a basis of reciprocity, in each
other's capitals where these do not already exist.
Everyone
should be allowed full use of these centers without
hindrance or discouragement from their own government.
3. The four Powers, where they do not already do so,
should permit the publication and facilitate the
distribution to public institutions and private individuals
in each other's countries of official periodicals printed in
English, French or Russian.
4. Exchanges of books, periodicals and newspapers
between the principal libraries, universities and
professional and scientific bodies in the Soviet Union and
the three Western countries should be encouraged.
Such
books, periodicals and newspapers should also be available
for general and unimpeded public sale in the Soviet Union on
the one hand and the three Western countries on the other.
5. There should be a substantial increase in the
exchange of government publications and full lists, catalogs
and indexes of such publications should be made available by
Governments where they do not already do so.
6. The film producers of the three Western countries
are ready to make films available to the Soviet Union at
normal commercial prices and on normal commercial terms.
Soviet films are already accepted in the West on these
terms.
7. There should be exchanges of exhibitions between
the Soviet Union and the three Western countries.
8. The systematic jamming of broadcasts of news and
information is a practice to be deplored.
It is
incompatible with the Directive from the Four Heads of
Government and should be discontinued.
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9.
The Soviet Union and the Western Powers should
consider the desirability of exchanging monthly uncensored
broadcasts on world developments. This could take the form
of half hours for the Soviet Union on the Western
broadcasting systems with reciprocal arrangements for the
Western Powers on the Soviet system.
10. The censorship of outgoing press despatches and
the denial to journalists of access to normal sources of
information are serious barriers to the free circulation of
ideas. The four Governments, where appropriate, should take
immediate steps to remove such barriers.
11. Private tourism should be increased.
This will
require more liberal procedures as regards travel
restrictions and other administrative practices. Above all
it will require reasonable rates of currency exchange.
12. There should be further exchanges of persons in
the professional, cultural, scientific and technical fields.
Exchanges should be arranged on the basis of principles
approved by the governments concerned.
13. Meetings of outstanding scientists and scholars of
the four countries at reputable international congresses
should be facilitated.
14. There should be cultural and sporting exchanges on
a reciprocal basis, drawing on the best each has to offer
under the auspices of the principal cultural institutions
and sporting organizations on both sides.
15. A beginning should be made with exchanges of
students, particularly those engaged in language and other
area studies.
It should be possible for the students to
share fully and freely the student life of the country they
visit.
16. Restrictions on the ability of the members of the
diplomatic missions of the four governments to travel in
each other's countries should be removed on a basis of
reciprocity.
17. Agreement should be reached in principle for
reciprocal exchanges of direct air transport services
between cities of the Soviet Union and cities of the three
Western countries.
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